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Abstract How can several individuals’ probability assignments to some events be
aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem
assume that the set of relevant events—the agenda—is a σ -algebra and is thus closed
under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection). We drop this demanding
assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. One might
be interested in the probability of rain and that of an interest-rate increase, but not
in the probability of rain or an interest-rate increase. We characterize linear pooling
and neutral pooling for general agendas, with classic results as special cases for agen-
das that are σ -algebras. As an illustrative application, we also consider probabilistic
preference aggregation. Finally, we unify our results with existing results on binary
judgment aggregation and Arrovian preference aggregation. We show that the same
kinds of axioms (independence and consensus preservation) have radically different
implications for different aggregation problems: linearity for probability aggregation
and dictatorship for binary judgment or preference aggregation.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of probabilistic opinion pooling. Suppose sev-
eral individuals (e.g., decision makers or experts) each assign probabilities to some
events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a collec-
tive probability assignment, while preserving probabilistic coherence? Although this
problem has been extensively studied in statistics, economics, and philosophy, one
standard assumption is seldom questioned: the set of events to which probabilities are
assigned—the agenda—is a σ -algebra: it is closed under negation (complementation)
and countable disjunction (union) of events. In practice, however, decision makers or
expert panels may not be interested in such a rich set of events. They may be inter-
ested, for example, in the probability of a blizzard and the probability of an interest-rate
increase, but not in the probability of a blizzard or an interest-rate increase. Of course,
the assumption that the agenda is a σ -algebra is convenient: probability functions
are defined on σ -algebras, and thus one can view probabilistic opinion pooling as
the aggregation of probability functions. But convenience is no ultimate justification.
Real-world expert committees typically do not assign probabilities to all events in a σ -
algebra. Instead, they focus on a limited set of relevant events, which need not contain
all disjunctions of its elements, let alone all disjunctions of countably infinite length.
There are two reasons why a disjunction of relevant events, or another logical
combination, may not be relevant. Either we are not interested in the probability of
such ‘artificial’ composite events. Or we (or the decision makers or experts) are unable
to assign subjective probabilities to them. To see why it can be difficult to assign a
subjective probability to a logical combination of ‘basic’ events—such as ‘a blizzard
or an interest-rate increase’—note that it is not enough to assign probabilities to the
underlying basic events: various probabilistic dependencies also affect the probability
of the composite event, and these may be the result of complex causal interconnections
(such as the causal effects between basic events and their possible common causes).
We investigate probabilistic opinion pooling for general agendas, dropping the
assumption of a σ -algebra. Thus any set of events that is closed under negation (com-
plementation) can qualify as an agenda. The general notion of an agenda is imported
from the theory of binary judgment aggregation (e.g., List and Pettit 2002, 2004;
Pauly and van Hees 2006; Dietrich 2006; Dietrich and List 2007a, 2013; Nehring and
Puppe 2010; Dokow and Holzman 2010; Dietrich and Mongin 2010). We impose two
axiomatic requirements on probabilistic opinion pooling:
(i) the familiar ‘independence’ requirement, according to which the collectively
assigned probability for each event should depend only on the probabilities that
the individuals assign to that event;
(ii) the requirement that certain unanimous individual judgments should be preserved;
we consider stronger and weaker variants of this requirement.
We prove two main results:
• For a large class of agendas—with σ -algebras as special cases—any opinion pool-
ing function satisfying (i) and (ii) is linear: the collective probability of each event
in the agenda is a weighted linear average of the individuals’ probabilities of that
event, where the weights are the same for all events.
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• For an even larger class of agendas, any opinion pooling function satisfying (i)
and (ii) is neutral: the collective probability of each event in the agenda is some
(possibly non-linear) function of the individuals’ probabilities of that event, where
the function is the same for all events.
We state three versions of each result, which differ in the nature of the unanimity-
preservation requirement and in the class of agendas to which they apply. Our results
generalize a classic characterization of linear pooling in the special case where the
agenda is a σ -algebra (Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981).1 For a σ -
algebra, every neutral pooling function is automatically linear, so that neutrality and
linearity are equivalent here (McConway 1981 and Wagner 1982).2 As we will see,
this fact does not carry over to general agendas: many agendas permit neutral but
non-linear opinion pooling functions.
Some of our results apply even to agendas containing only logically independent
events, such as ‘a blizzard’ and ‘an interest-rate increase’ (and their negations), but
no disjunctions or conjunctions of these events. Such agendas are relevant in practical
applications where the events in question are only probabilistically dependent (corre-
lated), but not logically dependent. If the agenda is a σ -algebra, by contrast, it is replete
with logical interconnections. By focusing on σ -algebras alone, the standard results
on probabilistic opinion pooling have therefore excluded many realistic applications.
We also present a new illustrative application of probabilistic opinion pooling,
namely to probabilistic preference aggregation. Here each individual assigns subjec-
tive probabilities to events of the form ‘x is preferable than y’ (or ‘x is better than y’),
where x and y range over a given set of alternatives. These probability assignments may
be interpreted as beliefs about which preferences are the ‘correct’ ones (e.g., which
correctly capture objective quality comparisons between the alternatives). Alterna-
tively, they may be interpreted as vague or fuzzy preferences. We then seek to arrive
at corresponding collective probability assignments.
Each of our linearity or neutrality results (with one exception) is logically tight:
the linearity or neutrality conclusion follows if and only if the agenda falls into a
relevant class. In other words, we characterize the agendas for which our axiomatic
requirements lead to linear or neutral aggregation. We thereby adopt the state-of-the-art
approach in binary judgment-aggregation theory, which is to characterize the agen-
1 Specifically, if the agenda is a σ -algebra (with more than four events), linear pooling functions are
the only pooling functions which satisfy independence and preserve unanimous probabilistic judgments
(Aczél and Wagner 1980; McConway 1981). Linearity and neutrality (the latter sometimes under the names
strong label neutrality or strong setwise function property) are among the most widely studied properties of
opinion pooling functions. Linear pooling goes back to Stone (1961) or even Laplace, and neutral pooling
to McConway (1981) and Wagner (1982). For extensions of (or alternatives to) the classic characterization
of linear pooling, see Wagner (1982, 1985), Lehrer and Wagner (1981), Aczél et al. (1984), Genest (1984),
Mongin (1995), and Chambers (2007). All these works retain the assumption that the agenda is a σ -algebra.
Genest and Zidek (1986), Clemen and Winkler (1999) and Dietrich and List (2016) provide surveys of the
classic literature. For opinion pooling under asymmetric information, see Dietrich (2010, 2016b), Russell
et al. (2015), and Dietrich and List (2016). For the aggregation of qualitative rather than quantitative
probabilities, see Weymark (1997). For a computational, non-axiomatic approach to the aggregation of
partial probability assignments, where individuals do not assign probabilities to all events in the σ -algebra,
see Osherson and Vardi (2006).
2 This assumes that the σ -algebra contains more than four events.
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das leading to certain possibilities or impossibilities of aggregation. This approach
was introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2002) in related work on strategy-proof social
choice and subsequently applied throughout binary judgment-aggregation theory. One
of our contributions is to show how it can be applied in the area of probabilistic opinion
pooling.
We conclude by comparing our results with their analogues in binary judgment-
aggregation theory and in Arrovian preference aggregation theory. Interestingly, the
conditions leading to linear pooling in probability aggregation correspond exactly
to the conditions leading to a dictatorship of one individual in both binary judgment
aggregation and Arrovian judgment aggregation. This yields a new unified perspective
on several at first sight disparate aggregation problems.
2 The framework
We consider a group of n ≥ 2 individuals, labelled i = 1, . . . , n, who have to assign
collective probabilities to some events.
The agenda Let  be a non-empty set of possible worlds (or states). An event is a subset
A of ; its complement (‘negation’) is denoted Ac := \A. The agenda is the set of
events to which probabilities are assigned. Traditionally, the agenda has been assumed
to be aσ -algebra (i.e., closed under complementation and countable union, and thereby
also under countable intersection). Here, we drop that assumption. As already noted,
we may exclude some events from the agenda, either because they are of no interest,
or because no probability assignments are available for them. For example, the agenda
may contain the events that global warming will continue, that interest rates will remain
low, and that the UK will remain in the European Union, but not the disjunction of
these events. Formally, we define an agenda as a non-empty set X of events which is
closed under complementation, i.e., A ∈ X ⇒ Ac ∈ X . Examples are X = {A, Ac}
or X = {A, Ac, B, Bc}, where A and B may or may not be logically related.
An example of an agenda without conjunctions or disjunctions Suppose each possible
world is a vector of three binary characteristics. The first takes the value 1 if atmo-
spheric CO2 is above some threshold, and 0 otherwise. The second takes the value 1
if there is a mechanism to the effect that if atmospheric CO2 is above that threshold,
then Arctic summers are ice-free, and 0 otherwise. The third takes the value 1 if Arctic
summers are ice-free, and 0 otherwise. Thus the set of possible worlds is the set of
all triples of 0s and 1s, excluding the inconsistent triple in which the first and second
characteristics are 1 and the third is 0, i.e.,  = {0, 1}3\{(1, 1, 0)}. We now define an
agenda X consisting of A, A → B, B, and their complements, where A is the event of
a positive first characteristic, A → B the event of a positive second characteristic, and
B the event of a positive third characteristic. (We use the sentential notation ‘A → B’
for better readability; formally, each of A, B, and A → B are subsets of .3) Although
3 Note that A → B (‘if A then B’) is best interpreted as a non-material conditional, since its negation, unlike
that of a material conditional, is consistent with the negation of its antecedent, A (i.e., Ac∩(A → B)c = ∅).
(A material conditional is always true when its antecedent is false.) The only assignment of truth-values
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there are some logical connections between these events (in particular, A and A → B
are inconsistent with Bc), the set X contains no conjunctions or disjunctions.
Probabilistic opinions We begin with the notion of a probability function. The classical
focus on agendas that are σ -algebras is motivated by the fact that such functions
are defined on σ -algebras. Formally, a probability function on a σ -algebra  is a
function P :  → [0, 1] such that P() = 1 and P is σ -additive (i.e., P(A1 ∪
A2 ∪ · · · ) = P(A1) + P(A2) + · · · for every sequence of pairwise disjoint events
A1, A2, . . . ∈ ). In the context of an arbitrary agenda X , we speak of ‘opinion
functions’ rather than ‘probability functions’. Formally, an opinion function for an
agenda X is a function P : X → [0, 1] which is probabilistically coherent, i.e.,
extendable to a probability function on the σ -algebra generated by X . This σ -algebra
is denoted σ(X) and defined as the smallest σ -algebra that includes X . It can be
constructed by closing X under countable unions and complements.4 In our expert-
committee example, we have σ(X) = 2, and an opinion function cannot assign
probability 1 to all of A, A → B, and Bc. (This would not be extendable to a well-
defined probability function on 2, given that A ∩ (A → B) ∩ Bc = ∅.) We write
PX to denote the set of all opinion functions for the agenda X . If X is a σ -algebra,
PX is the set of all probability functions on it.
Opinion pooling Given the agenda X , a combination of opinion functions across the
n individuals, (P1, . . . , Pn), is called a profile (of opinion functions). An (opinion)
pooling function is a function F : PnX → PX , which assigns to each pro-
file (P1, . . . , Pn) a collective opinion function P = F(P1, . . . , Pn), also denoted
PP1,...,Pn . For instance, PP1,...,Pn could be the arithmetic average 1n P1 + · · · + 1n Pn .
Linearity and neutrality A pooling function is linear if there exist real-valued weights
w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0 with w1 + · · · + wn = 1 such that, for every profile (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈
PnX ,
PP1,...,Pn (A) =
n∑
i=1
wi Pi (A) for all A ∈ X.
If wi = 1 for some ‘expert’ i , we obtain an expert rule given by PP1,...,Pn = Pi . More
generally, a pooling function is neutral if there exists some function D : [0, 1]n →
[0, 1] such that, for every profile (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ PnX ,
PP1,...,Pn (A) = D(P1(A), . . . , Pn(A)) for all A ∈ X. (1)
Footnote 3 Continued
to the events A, A → B, and B that is ruled out is (1, 1, 0). If we wanted to re-interpret → as a material
conditional, we would have to rule out in addition the truth-value assignments (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), and
(1, 0, 1), which would make little sense in the present example. The event A → B would become Ac ∪ B
(=(A ∩ Bc)c), and the agenda would no longer be free from conjunctions or disjunctions. However, the
agenda would still not be a σ -algebra. For a discussion of non-material conditionals, see, e.g., Priest (2001).
4 Whenever X contains A and B, then σ(X) contains A ∪ B, (A ∪ B)c , (A ∪ B)c ∪ B, and so on. In some
cases, all events may be constructible from events in X , so that σ(X) = 2.
123
F. Dietrich, C. List
We call D the local pooling criterion. Since it does not depend on the event A, all
events are treated equally (‘neutrality’). Linearity is the special case in which D is a
weighted linear averaging criterion of the form D(x) = ∑ni=1wi xi for all x ∈ [0, 1]n .
Note that, while every combination of weights w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0 with sum-total 1
defines a proper linear pooling function (since linear averaging preserves probabilistic
coherence), a given non-linear function D : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] might not define a proper
pooling function. Formula (1) might not yield a well-defined—i.e., probabilistically
coherent—opinion function. We will show that whether there can be neutral but non-
linear pooling functions depends on the agenda in question. If the agenda is aσ -algebra,
the answer is known to be negative (assuming |X | > 4). However, we will also identify
agendas for which the answer is positive.
Some logical terminology An event A is contingent if it is neither the empty set ∅
(impossible) nor the universal set  (necessary). A set S of events is consistent if its
intersection ∩A∈S A is non-empty, and inconsistent otherwise. A set S of events entails
another event B if the intersection of S is included in B (i.e., ∩A∈S A ⊆ B).
Two kinds of applications It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of applications
of probabilistic opinion pooling. We may be interested in either of the following:
(a) the probabilities of certain propositions expressed in natural language, such as ‘it
will rain tomorrow’ or ‘the new legislation will be repealed’;
(b) the distribution of some real-valued (or vector-valued) random variable, such as
the number of insurance claims over a given period, or tomorrow’s price of a
given share, or the weight of a randomly picked potato from some farm.
Arguably, probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas is more relevant to appli-
cations of type (a) than to applications of type (b). An application of type (a) typically
gives rise to an agenda expressible in natural language which does not constitute a
σ -algebra. It is then implausible to replace X with the σ -algebra σ(X), many elements
of which represent unduly complex combinations of other events. Further, even when
σ(X) is finite, it may be enormous. If X contains at least k logically independent
events, then σ(X) contains at least 22k events, so its size grows double-exponentially
in k.5 This suggests that, unless k is small, σ(X) may be too large to serve as an agenda
in practice. By contrast, an application of type (b) plausibly gives rise to an agenda that
is a σ -algebra. Here, the decision makers may need a full probability distribution over
the σ -algebra, and they may also be able to specify such a distribution. For instance,
a market analyst estimating next month’s distribution of Apple’s share price might
decide to specify a log-normal distribution. This, in turn, requires the specification of
only two parameters: the mean and the variance of the exponential of the share price.
We discuss opinion pooling problems of type (b) in a companion paper (Dietrich and
List 2017), where they are one of our principal applications. The companion paper
will be referred to as ‘Part II’.
5 For instance, if X contains k = 2 logically independent events, say A and B, then X includes a partition
A of  into 2k = 4 non-empty events, namely A = {A ∩ B, A ∩ Bc, Ac ∩ B, Ac ∩ Bc}, and hence X
includes the set {∪C∈CC : C ⊆ A} containing 22k = 16 events.
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3 Axiomatic requirements on opinion pooling
We now introduce some requirements on opinion pooling functions.
3.1 The independence requirement
Our first requirement, familiar from the literature, says that the collective probability
of each event in the agenda should depend only on the individual probabilities of that
event. This requirement is sometimes also called the weak setwise function property.
Independence For each event A ∈ X , there exists a function DA : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]
(the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX ,
PP1,...,Pn (A) = DA(P1(A), . . . , Pn(A)).
One justification for independence is the Condorcetian idea that the collective view
on any issue should depend only on individual views on that issue. This reflects a
local, rather than holistic, understanding of aggregation. (On a holistic understanding,
the collective view on an issue may be influenced by individual views on other issues.)
Independence, understood in this way, becomes less compelling if the agenda contains
‘artificial’ events, such as conjunctions of intuitively unrelated events, as in the case of
a σ -algebra. It would be implausible, for instance, to disregard the individual probabili-
ties assigned to ‘a blizzard’ and to ‘an interest-rate increase’ when determining the col-
lective probability of the disjunction of these events. Here, however, we focus on gen-
eral agendas, where the Condorcetian justification for independence is more plausible.
There are also two pragmatic justifications for independence; these apply even when
the agenda is a σ -algebra. First, aggregating probabilities issue-by-issue is informa-
tionally and computationally less demanding than a holistic approach and thus easier
to implement in practice. Second, independence prevents certain types of agenda
manipulation—the attempt by an agenda setter to influence the collective probabil-
ity assigned to some events by adding other events to, or removing them from, the
agenda.6 Nonetheless, independence should not be accepted uncritically, since it is
vulnerable to a number of well-known objections.7
3.2 The consensus-preservation requirement
Our next requirement says that if all individuals assign probability 1 (certainty) to an
event in the agenda, then its collective probability should also be 1.
6 When X is a σ -algebra, McConway (1981) shows that independence (his weak setwise function property)
is equivalent to the marginalization property, which requires aggregation to commute with the operation of
reducing the σ -algebra to some sub-σ -algebra ∗ ⊆ X . A similar result holds for general agendas X .
7 When the agenda is a σ -algebra, independence conflicts with the preservation of unanimously held
judgments of probabilistic independence, assuming non-dictatorial aggregation (Genest and Wagner 1987;
Bradley et al. 2014). Whether this objection also applies in the case of general agendas depends on the
precise nature of the agenda. Another objection is that independence is not generally compatible with
external Bayesianity, the requirement that aggregation commute with Bayesian updating of probabilities in
light of new information.
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Consensus preservation For all A ∈ X and all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX , if, for all i , Pi (A) =
1, then PP1,...,Pn (A) = 1.
Like independence, this requirement is familiar from the literature, where it is some-
times expressed as a zero-probability preservation requirement. In the case of general
agendas, we can also formulate several strengthened variants of the requirement, which
extend it to other forms of consensus. Although these variants are not as compelling
as their original precursor, they are still defensible in some cases. Moreover, when the
agenda is a σ -algebra, they all collapse back into consensus preservation in its original
form.
To introduce the different extensions of consensus preservation, we begin by draw-
ing a distinction between ‘explicitly revealed’, ‘implicitly revealed’, and ‘unrevealed’
beliefs:
• Individual i’s explicitly revealed beliefs are the probabilities assigned to events in
the agenda X by the opinion function Pi .
• Individual i’s implicitly revealed beliefs are the probabilities assigned to any events
in σ(X)\X by every probability function on σ(X) extending the opinion function
Pi ; we call such a probability function an extension of Pi and use the notation
Pi . These probabilities are ‘implied’ by the opinion function Pi . For instance, if
Pi assigns probability 1 to an event A in the agenda X , this ‘implies’ an assign-
ment of probability 1 to all events B outside the agenda that are of the form
B ⊇ A.
• Individual i’s unrevealed beliefs are probabilities for events in σ(X)\X that can-
not be deduced from the opinion function Pi . These are only privately held. For
instance, the opinion function Pi may admit extensions which assign probability
1 to an event B but may also admit extensions which assign a lower probability.
Here, individual i’s belief about B is unrevealed.
Consensus preservation in its original form concerns only explicitly revealed
beliefs. The first strengthened variant extends the requirement to implicitly revealed
beliefs. Let us say that an opinion function P on X implies certainty of an event A if
P(A) = 1 for every extension P of P .
Implicit consensus preservation For all A ∈ σ(X) and all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX , if, for all
i , Pi implies certainty of A, then PP1,...,Pn also implies certainty of A.
This ensures that whenever all individuals either explicitly or implicitly assign
probability 1 to some event, this is preserved at the collective level. Arguably,
this requirement is almost as plausible as consensus preservation in its original
form.
The second extension concerns unrevealed beliefs. Informally, it says that a unan-
imous assignment of probability 1 to some event should never be overruled, even if
it is unrevealed. This is operationalized as the requirement that if every individual’s
opinion function is consistent with the assignment of probability 1 to some event (so
that we cannot rule out the possibility of the individuals’ privately making that assign-
ment), then the collective opinion function should also be consistent with it. Formally,
we say that an opinion function P on X is consistent with certainty of an event A if
there exists some extension P of P such that P(A) = 1.
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Consensus compatibility For all A ∈ σ(X) and all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX , if, for all i ,
Pi is consistent with certainty of A, then PP1,...,Pn is also consistent with certainty
of A.
The rationale for this requirement is a precautionary one: if it is possible that all
individuals assign probability 1 to some event (though this may be unrevealed), the
collective opinion function should not rule out certainty of A.
A third extension of consensus preservation concerns conditional beliefs. It looks
more complicated than consensus compatibility, but it is less demanding. Its initial
motivation is the idea that if all individuals are certain of some event in the agenda
conditional on another event, then this conditional belief should be preserved collec-
tively. For instance, if everyone is certain that there will be a famine, given a civil war,
this belief should also be held collectively. Unfortunately, however, we cannot define
individual i’s conditional probability of an event A, given another event B, simply
as Pi (A|B) = Pi (A ∩ B)/Pi (B) (where Pi (B) = 0 and Pi is individual i’s opinion
function). This is because, even when A and B are in X , the event A∩B may be outside
X and thus outside the domain of Pi . So, we cannot know whether the individual is
certain of A given B. But we can ask whether he or she could be certain of A given
B, i.e., whether Pi (A|B) = 1 for some extension P of P .
This motivates the requirement that if each individual could be certain of A given
B, then the collective opinion function should also be consistent with this ‘conditional
certainty’. Again, this can be interpreted as requiring the preservation of certain unre-
vealed beliefs. A unanimous assignment of conditional probability 1 to one event,
given another, should not be overruled, even if it is unrevealed.
We capture this in the following way. Suppose there is a finite set of pairs of events
in X—call them (A, B), (A′, B ′), (A′′, B ′′), and so on—such that each individual
could be simultaneously certain of A given B, of A′ given B ′, of A′′ given B ′′, and
so on. Then the collective opinion function should also be consistent with conditional
certainty of A given B, A′ given B ′, and so on. Formally, for any finite set S of pairs
(A, B) of events in X , we say that an opinion function P on X is consistent with
conditional certainty of all (A, B) in S if there exists some extension P of P such that
P(A|B) = 1 for all (A, B) in S for which P(B) = 0.
Conditional consensus compatibility For all finite sets S of pairs of events in X and all
P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX , if, for all i , Pi is consistent with conditional certainty of all (A, B)
in S, then PP1,...,Pn is also consistent with conditional certainty of all (A, B) in S.
The following proposition summarizes the logical relationships between the differ-
ent consensus-preservation requirements; a proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 (a) Consensus preservation is implied by each of (i) implicit con-
sensus preservation, (ii) consensus compatibility, and (iii) conditional consensus
compatibility, and is equivalent to each of (i), (ii), and (iii) if the agenda X is a
σ -algebra.
(b) Consensus compatibility implies conditional consensus compatibility.
Each of our characterization results below uses consensus preservation in either its
original form or one of the strengthened forms. Implicit consensus preservation does
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not appear in any of our results; we have included it here for the sake of conceptual
completeness.8
4 When is opinion pooling neutral?
We now show that, for many agendas, the neutral pooling functions are the only pool-
ing functions satisfying independence and consensus preservation in either its original
form or one of the strengthened forms. The stronger the consensus-preservation
requirement, the larger the class of agendas for which our characterization of neutral
pooling holds. For the moment, we set aside the question of whether independence and
consensus preservation imply linearity as well as neutrality; we address this question
in the next section.
4.1 Three theorems
We begin with the strongest of our consensus-preservation requirements, i.e., con-
sensus compatibility. If we impose this requirement, our characterization of neutral
pooling holds for a very large class of agendas: all non-nested agendas. We call an
agenda X nested if it has the form X = {A, Ac : A ∈ X+} for some set X+ (⊆ X ) that
is linearly ordered by set-inclusion, and non-nested otherwise. For example, binary
agendas of the form X = {A, Ac} are nested: take X+ := {A}, which is trivially
linearly ordered by set-inclusion. Also, the agenda X = {(−∞, t], (t,∞) : t ∈ R}
(where the set of possible worlds is  = R) is nested: take X+ := {(−∞, t] : t ∈ R},
which is linearly ordered by set-inclusion.
By contrast, any agenda consisting of multiple logically independent pairs A, Ac
is non-nested, i.e., X is non-nested if X = {Ak, Ack : k ∈ K } with |K | ≥ 2 such
that every subset S ⊆ X containing precisely one member of each pair {Ak, Ack}
(with k ∈ K ) is consistent. As mentioned in the introduction, such agendas are of
practical importance because many decision problems involve events that exhibit only
probabilistic dependencies (correlations), but no logical ones. Another example of a
non-nested agenda is the one in the expert-committee example above, containing A,
A → B, B, and their complements.
Theorem 1 (a) For any non-nested agenda X, every pooling function F : PnX → PX
satisfying independence and consensus compatibility is neutral.
(b) For any nested agenda X ( = {∅,}), there exists a non-neutral pooling function
F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility.
Part (b) shows that the agenda condition used in part (a)—non-nestedness—is
tight: whenever the agenda is nested, non-neutral pooling functions become possible.
However, these pooling functions are non-neutral only in a limited sense: although the
8 An interesting fourth variant is the requirement obtained by combining the antecedent of implicit con-
sensus preservation with the conclusion of consensus compatibility. This condition weakens both implicit
consensus preservation and consensus compatibility, while still strengthening the initial consensus preser-
vation requirement.
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pooling criterion DA need not be the same for all events A ∈ X , it must still be the
same for all A ∈ X+, and the same for all A ∈ X\X+ (with X+ as defined above), so
that pooling is ‘neutral within X+’ and ‘neutral within X\X+’. This is clear from the
proof.9
What happens if we weaken the requirement of consensus compatibility to condi-
tional consensus compatibility? Both parts of Theorem 1 continue to hold, though part
(a) becomes logically stronger, and part (b) logically weaker. Let us state the modified
theorem explicitly:
Theorem 2 (a) For any non-nested agenda X, every pooling function F : PnX → PX
satisfying independence and conditional consensus compatibility is neutral.
(b) For any nested agenda X ( = {∅,}), there exists a non-neutral pooling function
F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and conditional consensus compatibility.
The situation changes once we weaken the consensus requirement further, namely to
consensus preservation simpliciter. The class of agendas for which our characterization
of neutrality holds shrinks significantly, namely to the class of path-connected agendas.
Path-connectedness is an important condition in judgment-aggregation theory, where
it was introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2010) (under the name ‘total blockedness’)
and has been used, for example, to generalize Arrow’s theorem (Dietrich and List
2007a; Dokow and Holzman 2010).
To define path-connectedness, we require one preliminary definition. Given an
agenda X , we say that an event A ∈ X conditionally entails another event B ∈ X ,
written A ∗ B, if there exists a subset Y ⊆ X (possibly empty, but not uncountably
infinite) such that {A}∪Y entails B, where, for non-triviality, Y ∪{A} and Y ∪{Bc} are
each consistent. For instance, if ∅ = A ⊆ B = , then A ∗ B (take Y = ∅; in fact,
this is even an unconditional entailment). Also, for the agenda of our expert committee,
X = {A, Ac, A → B, (A → B)c, B, Bc}, we have A ∗ B (take Y = {A → B}).
We call an agenda X path-connected if any two events A, B ∈ X\{∅,} can be
connected by a path of conditional entailments, i.e., there exist events A1, . . . , Ak ∈ X
(k ≥ 1) such that A = A1 ∗ A2 ∗ · · · ∗ Ak = B. An example of a path-connected
agenda is X := {A, Ac : A ⊆ R is a bounded interval}, where the underlying set
of worlds is  = R. For instance, there is a path of conditional entailments from
[0, 1] ∈ X to [2, 3] ∈ X given by [0, 1] ∗ [0, 3] ∗ [2, 3]. To establish [0, 1] ∗
[0, 3], it suffices to conditionalize on the empty set of events Y = ∅ (i.e., [0, 1] even
unconditionally entails [0, 3]). To establish [0, 3] ∗ [2, 3], one may conditionalize
on Y = {[2, 4]}.
Many agendas are not path-connected, including all nested agendas ( = {∅,})
and the agenda in our expert-committee example. The following result holds.
Theorem 3 (a) For any path-connected agenda X, every pooling function F : PnX →
PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation is neutral.
(b) For any non-path-connected agenda X (finite and distinct from {∅,}), there
exists a non-neutral pooling function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and
consensus preservation.
9 As a consequence, full neutrality follows even for nested agendas if independence is slightly strengthened
by requiring that DA = DAc for some A ∈ X\{∅,}.
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4.2 Proof sketches
We now outline the proofs of Theorems 1–3. (Details are given in the Appendix.) We
begin with part (a) of each theorem. Theorem 1(a) follows from Theorem 2(a), since
both results apply to the same agendas but Theorem 1(a) uses a stronger consensus
requirement.
To prove Theorem 2(a), we define a binary relation ∼ on the set of all contingent
events in the agenda. Recall that two events A and B are exclusive if A ∩ B = ∅ and
exhaustive if A ∪ B = . For any A, B ∈ X\{∅,}, we define
A ∼ B ⇔
there is a finite sequence A1, . . . , Ak ∈ X of length k ≥ 1 with A1 = A
and Ak = B such that any adjacent A j , A j+1 are neither exclusive nor
exhaustive.
Theorem 2(a) then follows immediately from the following two lemmas (proved in
the Appendix).
Lemma 1 For any agenda X ( ={∅,}), the relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on
X\{∅,}, with exactly two equivalence classes if X is nested, and exactly one if X is
non-nested.
Lemma 2 For any agenda X ( ={∅,}), a pooling function satisfying independence
and conditional consensus compatibility is neutral on each equivalence class with
respect to ∼ (i.e., the local pooling criterion is the same for all events in the same
equivalence class).
The proof of Theorem 3(a) uses the following lemma (broadly analogous to a lemma
in binary judgment-aggregation theory; e.g., Nehring and Puppe 2010 and Dietrich
and List 2007a).
Lemma 3 For any pooling function satisfying independence and consensus preser-
vation, and all events A and B in the agenda X, if A ∗ B then DA ≤ DB, where
DA and DB are the local pooling criteria for A and B, respectively. (Here DA ≤ DB
means that, for all (p1, . . . , pn), DA(p1, . . . , pn) ≤ DB(p1, . . . , pn).)
To see why Theorem 3(a) follows, simply note that DA ≤ DB whenever there is a
path of conditional entailments from A ∈ X to B ∈ X (by repeated application of the
lemma); thus, DA = DB whenever there are paths in both directions, as is guaranteed
if the agenda is path-connected and A, B /∈ {∅,}.
Part (b) of each theorem can be proved by explicitly constructing a non-neutral
pooling function—for an agenda of the relevant kind—which satisfies independence
and the appropriate consensus-preservation requirement. In the case of Theorem 3(b),
this pooling function is very complex, and hence we omit it in the main text. In the
case of Theorem 1(b) and 2(b), the idea can be described informally. Recall that a
nested agenda X can be partitioned into two subsets, X+ and X\X+ = {Ac : A ∈
X+}, each of which is linearly ordered by set-inclusion. The opinion pooling function
constructed has the property that (i) all events A in X+ have the same local pooling
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criterion D = DA, which can be defined, for example, as the square of a linear pooling
criterion (i.e., we first apply a linear pooling criterion and then take the square), and
(ii) all events in X\X+ have the same ‘complementary’ pooling criterion D∗, defined
as D∗(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 − D(1 − x1, . . . , 1 − xn) for all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n .
Showing that the resulting pooling function is well-defined and satisfies all the relevant
requirements involves some technicality, in part because we allow the agenda to have
any cardinality.
5 When is opinion pooling linear?
As we have seen, for many agendas, only neutral pooling functions can satisfy our
two requirements. But are these functions also linear? As we now show, the answer
depends on the agenda. If we suitably restrict the class of agendas considered in part
(a) of each of our previous theorems, we can derive linearity rather than just neutrality.
Similarly, we can expand the class of agendas considered in part (b) of each theorem,
and replace non-neutrality with non-linearity.
5.1 Three theorems
As in the previous section, we begin with the strongest consensus-preservation require-
ment, i.e., consensus compatibility. While this requirement leads to neutrality for all
non-nested agendas (by Theorem 1), it leads to linearity for all non-nested agendas
above a certain size.
Theorem 4 (a) For any non-nested agenda X with |X\{, ∅}| > 4, every pooling
function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility is
linear.
(b) For any other agenda X ( ={∅,}), there exists a non-linear pooling function
F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and consensus compatibility.
Next, let us weaken the requirement of consensus compatibility to conditional
consensus compatibility. While this requirement leads to neutrality for all non-
nested agendas (by Theorem 2), it leads to linearity only for non-simple agendas.
Like path-connected agendas, non-simple agendas play an important role in binary
judgment-aggregation theory, where they are the agendas susceptible to the analogues
of Condorcet’s paradox: the possibility of inconsistent majority judgments (e.g., Diet-
rich and List 2007b; Nehring and Puppe 2007).
To define non-simplicity, we first require a preliminary definition. We call a set of
events Y minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent but every proper subset Y ′  Y
is consistent. Examples of minimal inconsistent sets are (i) {A, B, (A ∩ B)c}, where
A and B are logically independent events, and (ii) {A, A → B, Bc}, with A, B, and
A → B as defined in the expert-committee example above. In each case, the three
events are mutually inconsistent, but any two of them are mutually consistent. The
notion of a minimal inconsistent set is useful for characterizing logical dependencies
between the events in the agenda. Trivial examples of minimal inconsistent subsets
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of the agenda are those of the form {A, Ac} ⊆ X , where A is contingent. But many
interesting agendas have more complex minimal inconsistent subsets. One may regard
supY⊆X :Y is minimal inconsistent |Y | as a measure of the complexity of the logical depen-
dencies in the agenda X . Given this idea, we call an agenda X non-simple if it has
at least one minimal inconsistent subset Y ⊆ X containing more than two (but not
uncountably many10) events, and simple otherwise. For instance, the agenda consist-
ing of A, A → B, B and their complements in our expert-committee example is
non-simple (take Y = {A, A → B, Bc}).
Non-simplicity lies logically between non-nestedness and path-connectedness: it
implies non-nestedness, and is implied by path-connectedness (if X = {, ∅}).11 To
see how exactly non-simplicity strengthens non-nestedness, note the following fact
(Dietrich 2016a):
Fact (a) An agenda X (with |X\{, ∅}| > 4) is non-nested if and only if it has at
least one subset Y with |Y | ≥ 3 such that (Y\{A}) ∪ {Ac} is consistent for each
A ∈ Y .
(b) An agenda X (with |X\{, ∅}| > 4) is non-simple if and only if it has at least one
inconsistent subset Y (of countable size) with |Y | ≥ 3 such that (Y\{A}) ∪ {Ac}
is consistent for each A ∈ Y .
Note that the characterizing condition in (b) can be obtained from the one in (a)
simply by replacing ‘subset Y ’ with ‘inconsistent subset Y (of countable size)’.
Theorem 5 (a) For any non-simple agenda X with |X\{, ∅}| > 4, every pooling
function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and conditional consensus
compatibility is linear.
(b) For any simple agenda X (finite and distinct from {∅,}), there exists a non-
linear pooling function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and conditional
consensus compatibility.
Finally, we turn to the least demanding consensus requirement, namely consensus
preservation simpliciter. We have seen that this requirement leads to neutral pooling
if the agenda is path-connected (by Theorem 3). To obtain a characterization of linear
10 This countability addition can often be dropped because all minimal inconsistent sets Y ⊆ X are auto-
matically finite or at least countable. This is so if X is finite or countably infinite, and also if the underlying
set of worlds  is countable. It can further be dropped in case the events in X are represented by sen-
tences in a language. Then, provided this language belongs to a compact logic, all minimal inconsistent
sets Y ⊆ X are finite (because any inconsistent set has a finite inconsistent subset). By contrast, if X is a
σ -algebra and has infinite cardinality, then it usually contains events not representing sentences, because
countably infinite disjunctions cannot be formed in a language. Such agendas often have uncountable mini-
mal inconsistent subsets. For instance, if X is the σ -algebra of Borel-measurable subsets of R, then its subset
Y = {R\{x} : x ∈ R} is uncountable and minimal inconsistent. This agenda is nonetheless non-simple,
since it also has many finite minimal inconsistent subsets Y with |Y | ≥ 3 (e.g., Y = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}).
11 To give an example of a non-nested but simple agenda X , let X = {A, Ac, B, Bc}, where the events A
and B are logically independent, i.e., A ∩ B, A ∩ Bc, Ac ∩ B, Ac ∩ Bc = ∅. Clearly, this agenda is non-
nested. It is simple since its only minimal inconsistent subsets are {A, Ac} and {B, Bc}. To give an example
of a non-path-connected, but non-simple agenda, let X consist of A, A → B, B and their complements, as
in our example above. We have already observed that it is non-simple. To see that it is not path-connected,
note, for example, that there is no path of conditional entailments from B to Bc .
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pooling, path-connectedness alone is not enough. In the following theorem, we impose
an additional condition on the agenda. We call an agenda X partitional if it has a
subset Y which partitions  into at least three non-empty events (where Y is finite
or countably infinite), and non-partitional otherwise. (A subset Y of X partitions 
if the elements of Y are individually non-empty, pairwise disjoint, and cover .) For
instance, X is partitional if it contains (non-empty) events A, Ac ∩ B, and Ac ∩ Bc;
simply let Y = {A, Ac ∩ B, Ac ∩ Bc}.
Theorem 6 (a) For any path-connected and partitional agenda X, every pooling
function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation is
linear.
(b) For any non-path-connected (finite) agenda X, there exists a non-linear pooling
function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation.
Part (b) shows that one of theorem’s agenda conditions, path-connectedness, is
necessary for the characterization of linear pooling (which is unsurprising, as it is
necessary for the characterization of neutral pooling). By contrast, the other agenda
condition, partitionality, is not necessary: linearity also follows from independence
and consensus preservation for some non-partitional but path-connected agendas. So,
the agenda conditions of part (a) are non-minimal. We leave the task of finding minimal
agenda conditions as a challenge for future research.12
Despite its non-minimality, the partionality condition in Theorem 6 is not redundant:
if it were dropped (and not replaced by something else), part (a) would cease to hold.
This follows from the following (non-trivial) proposition:
Proposition 2 For some path-connected and non-partitional (finite) agenda X, there
exists a non-linear pooling function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence (even
neutrality) and consensus preservation.13
Readers familiar with binary judgment-aggregation theory will notice that the
agenda which we construct to prove this proposition violates an important agenda
condition from that area, namely even-number negatability (or non-affineness) (see
Dietrich 2007; Dietrich and List 2007a, b; Dokow and Holzman 2010). It would be
intriguing if the same condition turned out to be the correct minimal substitute for
partionality in Theorem 6.
5.2 Proof sketches
We now describe how Theorems 4–6 can be proved. (Again, details are given in
the Appendix.) We begin with part (a) of each theorem. To prove Theorem 4(a),
12 A generalized definition of partitionality is possible in Theorem 6: we could define X to be partitional if
there are finite or countably infinite subsets Y, Z ⊆ X such that the set {A∩C : A ∈ Y }, with C = ∩B∈Z B,
partitions C into at least three non-empty events. This definition generalizes the one in the main text,
because if we take Z = ∅, then C becomes  (= ∩B∈∅ B) and Y simply partitions . But since we do
not know whether this generalized definition renders partitionality logically minimal in Theorem 6, we use
the simpler definition in the main text.
13 In this proposition, we assume that the underlying set of worlds  satisfies || ≥ 4.
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consider a non-nested agenda X with |X\{, ∅}| > 4 and a pooling function F
satisfying independence and consensus compatibility. We want to show that F is
linear. Neutrality follows from Theorem 1(a). From neutrality, we can infer linearity
by using two lemmas. The first contains the bulk of the work, and the second is an
application of Cauchy’s functional equation (similar to its application in Aczél and
Wagner 1980 and McConway 1981). Let us write 0 and 1 to denote the n-tuples
(0, . . . , 0) and (1, . . . , 1), respectively.
Lemma 4 If D : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neu-
tral and consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-nested agenda X with
|X\{, ∅}| > 4, then
D(x) + D(y) + D(z) = 1 for all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]n with x + y + z = 1. (2)
Lemma 5 If a function D : [0, 1n] → [0, 1] with D(0) = 0 satisfies (2), then it takes
the linear form
D(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
i=1
wi xi for all x ∈ [0, 1]n
for some non-negative weights w1, . . . , wn with sum 1.
The proof of Theorem 5(a) follows a similar strategy, but replaces Lemma 4 with
the following lemma:
Lemma 6 If D : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and
conditional-consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-simple agenda X, then
(2) holds.
Finally, Theorem 6(a) can also be proved using a similar strategy, this time replacing
Lemma 4 with the following lemma:
Lemma 7 If D : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral and
consensus-preserving pooling function for a partitional agenda X, then (2) holds.
Part (b) of each of Theorems 4–6 can be proved by constructing a suitable example
of a non-linear pooling function. In the case of Theorem 4(b), we can re-use the non-
neutral pooling function constructed to prove Theorem 1(b) as long as the agenda
satisfies |X\{, ∅}| > 4; for (small) agendas with |X\{, ∅}| ≤ 4, we construct
a somewhat simplistic pooling function generating collective opinion functions that
only assign probabilities of 0, 12 , or 1. The constructions for Theorems 5(b) and 6(b)
are more difficult; the one for Theorem 5(b) also has the property that collective
probabilities never take values other than 0, 12 , or 1.
6 Classic results as special cases
It is instructive to see how our present results generalize classic results in the literature,
where the agenda is a σ -algebra (especially Aczél and Wagner 1980 and McConway
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1981). Note that, for a σ -algebra, all the agenda conditions we have used reduce to a
simple condition on agenda size:
Lemma 8 For any agenda X ( ={, ∅}) that is closed under pairwise union or
intersection (i.e., any agenda that is an algebra), the conditions of non-nestedness,
non-simplicity, path-connectedness, and partitionality are equivalent, and are each
satisfied if and only if |X | > 4.
Note, further, that when X is a σ -algebra, all of our consensus requirements become
equivalent, as shown by Proposition 1(a). It follows that, in the special case of a σ -
algebra, our six theorems reduce to two classical results:
• Theorems 1–3 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying indepen-
dence and consensus preservation are neutral if |X | > 4, but not if |X | = 4;
• Theorems 4–6 reduce to the result that all pooling functions satisfying indepen-
dence and consensus preservation are linear if |X | > 4, but not if |X | = 4.
The case |X | < 4 is uninteresting because it implies that X = {∅,}, given that X
is a σ -algebra. In fact, we can derive these classic theorems not only for σ -algebras,
but also for algebras. This is because, given Lemma 8, Theorems 3 and 6 have the
following implication:
Corollary 1 For any agenda X that is closed under pairwise union or intersection
(i.e., any agenda that is an algebra),
(a) if |X | > 4, every pooling function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and
consensus preservation is linear (and by implication neutral);
(b) if |X | = 4, there exists a non-neutral (and by implication non-linear) pooling
function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and consensus preservation.
7 Probabilistic preference aggregation
To illustrate the use of general agendas, we now present an application to probabilistic
preference aggregation, a probabilistic analogue of Arrovian preference aggregation.
A group seeks to rank a set K of at least two (mutually exclusive and exhaustive)
alternatives in a linear order. Let K be the set of all strict orderings  over K
(asymmetric, transitive, and connected binary relations). Informally, K can represent
any set of distinct objects, e.g., policy options, candidates, social states, or distributions
of goods, and an ordering  over K can have any interpretation consistent with a linear
form (e.g., ‘better than’, ‘preferable to’, ‘higher than’, ‘more competent than’, ‘less
unequal than’ etc.).
For any two distinct alternatives x and y in K , let x  y denote the event that x is
ranked above y; i.e., x  y denotes the subset of K consisting of all those orderings
 in K such that x  y. We define the preference agenda as the set
X K = {x  y : x, y ∈ K with x = y},
which is non-empty and closed under complementation, as required for an agenda
(this construction draws on Dietrich and List 2007a). In our opinion pooling problem,
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each individual i submits probability assignments for the events in X K , and the group
then determines corresponding collective probability assignments. An agent’s opinion
function P : X K → [0, 1] can be interpreted as capturing the agent’s degrees of belief
about which of the various pairwise comparisons x  y (in X K ) are ‘correct’; call
this the belief interpretation. Thus, for any two distinct alternatives x and y in K ,
P(x  y) can be interpreted as the agent’s degree of belief in the event x  y,
i.e., the event that x is ranked above (preferable to, better than, higher than …) y.
(On a different interpretation, the vague-preference interpretation, P(x  y) could
represent the degree to which the agent prefers x to y, so that the present framework
would capture vague preferences over alternatives as opposed to degrees of belief
about how they are ranked in terms of the appropriate criterion.) A pooling function,
as defined above, maps n individual such opinion functions to a single collective one.
What are the structural properties of this preference agenda?
Lemma 9 For a preference agenda X K , the conditions of non-nestedness, non-
simplicity, and path-connectedness are equivalent, and are each satisfied if and only
if |K | > 2; the condition of partitionality is violated for any K .
The proof that the preference agenda is non-nested if and only if |K | > 2 is trivial.
The analogous claims for non-simplicity and path-connectedness are well-established
in binary judgment-aggregation theory, to which we refer the reader.14 Finally, it is
easy to show that any preference agenda violates partitionality.
Since the preference agenda is non-nested, non-simple, and path-connected when
|K | > 2, Theorems 1(a), 2(a), 3(a), 4(a), and 5(a) apply; but Theorem 6(a) does not,
because partitionality is violated. Let us here focus on Theorem 5. This theorem has
the following corollary for the preference agenda:
Corollary 2 For a preference agenda X K ,
(a) if |K | > 2, every pooling function F : PnX → PX satisfying independence and
conditional consensus compatibility is linear;
(b) if |K | = 2, there exists a non-linear pooling function F : PnX → PX satisfying
independence and conditional consensus compatibility.
It is interesting to compare this result with Arrow’s classic theorem. While Arrow’s
theorem yields a negative conclusion if |K | > 2 (showing that only dictatorial aggrega-
tion functions satisfy its requirements), our linearity result does not have any negative
flavour. We obtain this positive result despite the fact that our axiomatic require-
ments are comparable to Arrow’s. Independence, in our framework, is the probabilistic
analogue of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives: for any pair of distinct
alternatives x, y in K , the collective probability for x  y should depend only on indi-
vidual probabilities for x  y. Conditional consensus compatibility is a strengthened
analogue of Arrow’s weak Pareto principle (an exact analogue would be consensus
preservation): it requires that, for any two pairs of distinct alternatives, x, y ∈ K and
14 To see that X K is non-simple if |K | > 2, choose three distinct alternatives x, y, z ∈ K and note that the
three events x  y, y  z, and z  x in X K are mutually inconsistent, but any pair of them is consistent,
so that they form a minimal inconsistent subset of X K .
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v,w ∈ K , if all individuals are certain that x  y given that v  w, then this agree-
ment should be preserved at the collective level. The analogues of Arrow’s universal
domain and collective rationality are built into our definition of a pooling function,
whose domain and co-domain are defined as the set of all (by definition coherent)
opinion functions over X K .
Thus our result points towards an alternative escape-route from Arrow’s impossi-
bility theorem (though it may be practically applicable only in special contexts): if
we enrich Arrow’s informational framework by allowing degrees of belief over differ-
ent possible linear orderings as input and output of the aggregation (or alternatively,
vague preferences, understood probabilistically), then we can avoid Arrow’s dicta-
torship conclusion. Instead, we obtain a positive characterization of linear pooling,
despite imposing requirements on the pooling function that are stronger than Arrow’s
classic requirements (in so far as conditional consensus compatibility is stronger than
the analogue of the weak Pareto principle).
On the belief interpretation, the present informational framework is meaningful so
long as there exists a fact of the matter about which of the orderings  in K is the
‘correct’ one (e.g., an objective quality ordering), so that it makes sense to form beliefs
about this fact. On the vague-preference interpretation, our framework requires that
vague preferences over pairs of alternatives are extendable to a coherent probability
distribution over the set of ‘crisp’ orderings  in K .
There are, of course, substantial bodies of literature on avoiding Arrow’s dicta-
torship conclusion in richer informational frameworks and on probabilistic or vague
preference aggregation. It is well known, for example, that the introduction of inter-
personally comparable preferences (of an ordinal or cardinal type) is sufficient for
avoiding Arrow’s negative conclusion (e.g., Sen 1970/1979). Also, different mod-
els of probabilistic or vague preference aggregation have been proposed.15 A typical
assumption is that, for any pair of alternatives x, y ∈ K , each individual prefers x to
y to a certain degree between 0 and 1. However, the standard constraints on vague or
fuzzy preferences do not require individuals to hold probabilistically coherent opin-
ion functions in our sense; hence the literature has tended to generate Arrow-style
impossibility results. By contrast, it is illuminating to see that a possibility result on
probabilistic preference aggregation can be derived as a corollary of one of our new
results on probabilistic opinion pooling.
8 A unified perspective
Finally, we wish to compare probabilistic opinion pooling with binary judgment aggre-
gation and Arrovian preference aggregation in its original form. Thanks to the notion
of a general agenda, we can represent each of these other aggregation problems within
the present framework.
15 A model in which individuals and the collective specify probabilities of selecting each of the alternatives
in K (as opposed to probability assignments over events of the form ‘x is ranked above y’) has been studied,
for instance, by Intriligator (1973), who has characterized a version of linear averaging in it. Similarly, a
model in which individuals have vague or fuzzy preferences has been studied, for instance, by Billot (1991)
and more recently by Piggins and Perote-Peña (2007) (see also Sanver and Selçuk 2009).
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• To represent binary judgment aggregation, we simply need to restrict attention
to binary opinion functions, i.e., opinion functions that take only the values 0
and 1.16 Binary opinion functions correspond to consistent and complete judg-
ment sets in judgment-aggregation theory, i.e., sets of the form J ⊆ X which
satisfy ∩A∈J A = ∅ (consistency) and contain a member of each pair A, Ac ∈ X
(completeness).17 A binary opinion pooling function assigns to each profile of
binary opinion functions a collective binary opinion function. Thus, binary opin-
ion pooling functions correspond to standard judgment aggregation functions (with
universal domain and consistent and complete outputs).
• To represent preference aggregation, we need to restrict attention both to the pref-
erence agenda, as introduced in Sect. 7, and to binary opinion functions, as just
defined. Binary opinion functions for the preference agenda correspond to linear
preference orders, as familiar from preference aggregation theory in the tradition
of Arrow. Here, binary opinion pooling functions correspond to Arrovian social
welfare functions.
The literature on binary judgment aggregation contains several theorems that use
axiomatic requirements similar to those used here. In the binary case, however, these
requirements lead to dictatorial, rather than linear, aggregation, as in Arrow’s original
impossibility theorem in preference-aggregation theory. In fact, Arrow-like theorems
are immediate corollaries of the results on judgment aggregation, when applied to the
preference agenda (e.g., Dietrich and List 2007a; List and Pettit 2004). In particular, the
independence requirement reduces to Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and the unanimity-preservation requirements reduce to variants of the Pareto principle.
How can the same axiomatic requirements lead to a positive conclusion—
linearity—in the probabilistic framework and to a negative one—dictatorship—in
the binary case? The reason is that, in the binary case, linearity collapses into dictator-
ship because the only well-defined linear pooling functions are dictatorial here. Let us
explain this point. Linearity of a binary opinion pooling function F is defined just as
in the probabilistic framework: there exist real-valued weights w1, . . . , wn ≥ 0 with
w1 + · · · + wn = 1 such that, for every profile (P1, . . . , Pn) of binary opinion func-
tions, the collective truth-value of any given event A in the agenda X is the weighted
arithmetic average w1 P1(A) + · · · + wn Pn(A). Yet, for this to define a proper binary
opinion pooling function, some individual i must get a weight of 1 and all others must
get a weight of 0, since otherwise the average w1 P1(A) + · · · + wn Pn(A) could fall
strictly between 0 and 1, violating the binary restriction. In other words, linearity is
equivalent to dictatorship here.18
16 Formally, a binary opinion function is a function f : X → {0, 1} that is extendible to a probability
function on σ(X), or equivalently, to a truth-function on σ(X) (i.e., a {0, 1}-valued function on σ(X) that
is logically consistent).
17 Specifically, a binary opinion function f : X → {0, 1} corresponds to the consistent and complete
judgment set {A ∈ X : f (A) = 1}.
18 To be precise, for (trivial) agendas with X\{, ∅} = ∅, the weights wi may differ from 1 and 0.
But it still follows that every linear binary opinion pooling function (in fact, every binary opinion pooling
function) is dictatorial here, for the trivial reason that there is only one binary opinion function and thus
only one (dictatorial) binary opinion pooling function.
123
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one...
We can obtain a unified perspective on several distinct aggregation problems by
combining this paper’s linearity results with the corresponding dictatorship results
from the existing literature (adopting the unification strategy proposed in Dietrich and
List 2010). This yields several unified characterization theorems applicable to prob-
ability aggregation, judgment aggregation, and preference aggregation. Let us state
these results. The first combines Theorem 4 with a result due to Dietrich (2016a); the
second combines Theorem 5 with a result due to Dietrich and List (2013); and the
third combines Theorem 6 with the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggre-
gation (Dietrich and List 2007a and Dokow and Holzman 2010). In the binary case,
the independence requirement and our various unanimity requirements are defined as
in the probabilistic framework, but with a restriction to binary opinion functions.19
Theorem 4+
(a) For any non-nested agenda X with |X\{, ∅}| > 4, every binary or probabilistic
opinion pooling function satisfying independence and consensus compatibility is
linear (where linearity reduces to dictatorship in the binary case).
(b) For any other agenda X ( = {∅,}), there exists a non-linear binary or
probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and consensus
compatibility.
Theorem 5+
(a) For any non-simple agenda X with |X\{, ∅}| > 4, every binary or probabilis-
tic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and conditional consensus
compatibility is linear (where linearity reduces to dictatorship in the binary case).
(b) For any simple agenda X (finite and distinct from {∅,}), there exists a non-
linear binary or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence
and conditional consensus compatibility.
Theorem 6+
(a) For any path-connected and partitional agenda X , every binary or probabilistic
opinion pooling function satisfying independence and consensus preservation is
linear (where linearity reduces to dictatorship in the binary case).
(b) For any non-path-connected (finite) agenda X , there exists a non-linear binary
or probabilistic opinion pooling function satisfying independence and consensus
preservation.20
By Lemma 9, Theorems 4+, 5+, and 6+ are relevant to preference aggregation
insofar as the preference agenda X K satisfies each of non-nestedness, non-simplicity,
and path-connectedness if and only if |K | > 2, where K is the set of alternatives.
Recall, however, that the preference agenda is never partitional, so that part (a) of
19 In the binary case, two of our unanimity-preservation requirements (implicit consensus preservation and
consensus compatibility) are equivalent, because every binary opinion function is uniquely extendible to
σ(X). Also, conditional consensus compatibility can be stated more easily in the binary case, namely in
terms of a single conditional judgment rather than a finite set of conditional judgments.
20 In the binary case in part (a), partionality can be weakened to even-number negatability or non-affineness.
See Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010).
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Theorem 6+ never applies. By contrast, the binary result on which part (a) is based
applies to the preference agenda, as it uses the weaker condition of even-number-
negatability (or non-affineness) instead of partitionality (and that weaker condition is
satisfied by X K if |K | > 2). As noted above, it remains an open question how far
partitionality can be weakened in the probabilistic case.21
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix: Proofs
We now prove all our results. In light of the mathematical connection between the
present results and those in Part II on ‘premise-based’ opinion pooling for σ -algebra
agendas, one might imagine two possible proof strategies: either one could prove our
present results directly and those in Part II as corollaries, or vice versa. In fact, we
will mix those two strategies. We will prove the parts (a) of all present theorems
directly (and use them in Part II to derive corresponding results), while we will prove
the parts (b) of present theorems sometimes directly and sometimes as corollaries of
corresponding results from Part II.
This Appendix is organised as follows. In Sects. A.1–A.5, we prove parts (a) of
Theorems 2–6, along with related results. Theorem 1(a) requires no independent proof,
as it follows from Theorem 2(a). In Sect. A.6, we clarify the connection between the
two papers, and then prove parts (b) of all present theorems. Finally, in Sect. A.7, we
prove Propositions 1 and 2.
A.1: Proof of Theorem 2(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 2(a) follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. We now
prove these lemmas. To do so, we will also prove some preliminary results.
Lemma 10 Consider any agenda X.
(a) ∼ defines an equivalence relation on X\{∅,}.
(b) A ∼ B ⇔ Ac ∼ Bc for all events A, B ∈ X\{∅,}.
(c) A ⊆ B ⇒ A ∼ B for all events A, B ∈ X\{∅,}.
(d) If X = {∅,}, the relation ∼ has
• either a single equivalence class, namely X\{∅,},
• or exactly two equivalence classes, each one containing exactly one member
of each pair A, Ac ∈ X\{∅,}.
21 Of course, one could also state unified versions of Theorems 1–3 on neutral opinion pooling, by combin-
ing these theorems with existing results on binary judgment aggregation. We would simply need to replace
the probabilistic opinion pooling function F : PnX → PX with a binary or probabilistic such function.
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Proof (a) Reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity on X\{∅,} are all obvious (we
have excluded ∅ and  to ensure reflexivity).
(b) It suffices to prove one direction of implication (as (Ac)c = A for all A ∈ X ).
Let A, B ∈ X\{∅,} with A ∼ B. Then there is a path A1, . . . , Ak ∈ X from
A to B such that any neighbours A j , A j+1 are non-exclusive and non-exhaustive.
So Ac1, . . . , A
c
k is a path from A
c to Bc, where any neighbours Acj , A
c
j+1 are non-
exclusive (as Acj ∩ Acj+1 = (A j ∪ A j+1)c = c = ∅) and non-exhaustive (as
Acj ∪ Acj+1 = (A j ∩ A j+1)c = ∅c = ). So, Ac ∼ Bc.
(c) Let A, B ∈ X\{∅,}. If A ⊆ B, then A ∼ B due to a direct connection,
because A, B are neither exclusive (as A ∩ B = A = ∅) nor exhaustive (as
A ∪ B = B = ).
(d) Let X = {∅,}. Suppose the number of equivalence classes with respect to ∼
is not one. As X\{∅,} = ∅, it is not zero. So it is at least two. We show two
claims:
Claim 1 There are exactly two equivalence classes with respect to ∼.
Claim 2 Each class contains exactly one member of any pair A, Ac ∈ X\{∅,}.
Proof of Claim 1 For a contradiction, let A, B, C ∈ X\{∅,} be pairwise not
(∼-)equivalent. By A  B, either A ∩ B = ∅ or A ∪ B = . We may assume
the former case, because in the latter case we may consider Ac, Bc, Cc instead
of A, B, C . (Note that Ac, Bc, Cc are again pairwise non-equivalent by (b) and
Ac ∩ Bc = (A ∪ B)c = c = ∅.) Now, since A ∩ B = ∅, we have B ⊆ Ac,
whence Ac ∼ B by (c). By A  C , there are two cases:
• either A ∩ C = ∅, which implies C ⊆ Ac, whence C ∼ Ac by (c), so that C ∼ B
(as Ac ∼ B and ∼ is transitive by (a)), a contradiction;
• or A ∪ C = , which implies Ac ⊆ C , whence Ac ∼ C by (c), so that again we
derive the contradiction C ∼ B, which completes the proof of Claim 1. unionsq
Proof of Claim 2 For a contradiction, let Z be an (∼-)equivalence class containing
the pair A, Ac. By assumption, Z is not the only equivalence class, so there is a
B ∈ X\{∅,} with B  A (hence B  Ac). Then either A ∩ B = ∅ or A ∪ B = .
In the first case, B ⊆ Ac, so that B ∼ Ac by (c), a contradiction. In the second case,
Ac ⊆ B, so that Ac ∼ B by (c), a contradiction. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 1 Consider an agenda X = {∅,}. By Lemma 10(a), ∼ is indeed
an equivalence relation on X\{∅,}. By Lemma 10(d), it remains to prove that X is
nested if and only if there are exactly two equivalence classes. Note that X is nested
if and only if X\{∅,} is nested. So we may assume without loss of generality that
∅, /∈ X .
First, suppose there are two equivalence classes. Let X+ be one of them. By
Lemma 10(d), X = {A, Ac : A ∈ X+}. To complete the proof that X is nested,
we show that X+ is linearly ordered by set-inclusion ⊆. Clearly, ⊆ is reflexive, tran-
sitive, and anti-symmetric. We must show that it is connected. So, let A, B ∈ X+; we
prove that A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A. Since A  Bc (by Lemma 10(d)), either A ∩ Bc = ∅
or A ∪ Bc = . So, either A ⊆ B or B ⊆ A.
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Conversely, let X be nested. So X = {A, Ac : A ∈ X+} for some set X+ ⊆
X that is linearly ordered by set inclusion. Let A ∈ X+. We show that A  Ac,
implying that X has at least—so by Lemma 10(d) exactly—two equivalence classes.
For a contradiction, suppose A ∼ Ac. Then there is a path A1, . . . , Ak ∈ X from
A = A1 to Ac = Ak such that, for all neighbours A j , A j+1, A j ∩ A j+1 = ∅ and
A j ∪ A j+1 = . Since each event C ∈ X either is in X+ or has its complement in
X+, and since A1 = A ∈ X+ and Ack = A ∈ X+, there are neighbours A j , A j+1
such that A j , Acj+1 ∈ X+. So, as X+ is linearly ordered by ⊆, either A j ⊆ Acj+1 or
Acj+1 ⊆ A j , i.e., either A j ∩ A j+1 = ∅ or A j ∪ A j+1 = , a contradiction. unionsq
We now give a useful re-formulation of the requirement of conditional consensus
compatibility for opinion pooling on a general agenda X . Note first that an opinion
function is consistent with certainty of A (∈ X ) given B (∈ X ) if and only if it is
consistent with certainty of the event ‘B implies A’ (i.e., with zero probability of the
event B\A or ‘B but not A’). This observation yields the following re-formulation
of conditional consensus compatibility (in which the roles of A and B have been
interchanged):
Implication preservation For all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX , and all finite sets S of pairs (A, B)
of events in X , if every opinion function Pi is consistent with certainty that A implies
B for all (A, B) in S (i.e., some extension Pi ∈ Pσ(X) of Pi satisfies Pi (A\B) = 0
for all pairs (A, B) ∈ S), then so is the collective opinion function PP1,...,Pn .
Proposition 3 For any agenda X, a pooling function F : PnX → PX is conditional
consensus compatible if and only if it is implication preserving.
Proof of Lemma 2 Let F be an independent and conditional-consensus-compatible
pooling function for agenda X . For all A ∈ X , let DA be the pooling criterion given
by independence. We show that DA = DB for all A, B ∈ X with A ∩ B = ∅ and
A ∪ B = . This will imply that DA = DB whenever A ∼ B (by induction on the
length of a path from A to B), which completes the proof.
So, let A, B ∈ X with A ∩ B = ∅ and A ∪ B = . Notice that A ∩ B, A ∪ B,
and A\B need not belong to X . Let x ∈ [0, 1]n ; we show that DA(x) = DB(x). As
A ∩ B = ∅ and Ac ∩ Bc = (A ∪ B)c = ∅, there are P1, . . . , Pn ∈ Pσ(X) such that
Pi (A ∩ B) = xi and Pi (Ac ∩ Bc) = 1 − xi for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Now consider the opinion functions P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX given by Pi := Pi |X . Since
Pi (A\B) = 0 and Pi (B\A) = 0 for all i , the collective opinion function PP1,...,Pn has
an extension P P1,...,Pn ∈ Pσ(X) such that P P1,...,Pn (A\B) = P P1,...,Pn (B\A) = 0,
by implication preservation (which is equivalent to conditional consensus compati-
bility by Proposition 3). So P P1,...,Pn (A) = P P1,...,Pn (A ∩ B) = P P1,...,Pn (B), and
hence, PP1,...,Pn (A) = PP1,...,Pn (B). So, using the fact that PP1,...,Pn (A) = DA(x) (as
Pi (A) = xi for all i) and PP1,...,Pn (B) = DB(x) (as Pi (B) = xi for all i), we have
DA(x) = DB(x). unionsq
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A.2: Proof of Theorem 3(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 3(a) follows from Lemma 3, which we now
prove.
Proof of Lemma 3 Let F : PnX → PX be independent and consensus-preserving. Let
A, B ∈ X such that A ∗ B, say in virtue of (countable) set Y ⊆ X . Write DA
and DB for the pooling criterion for A and B, respectively. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
[0, 1]n . We show that DA(x) ≤ DB(x). As ∩C∈{A}∪Y C is non-empty but has empty
intersection with Bc (by the conditional entailment), it equals its intersection with
B, so ∩C∈{A,B}∪Y C = ∅. Similarly, as ∩C∈{Bc}∪Y C is non-empty but has empty
intersection with A, it equals its intersection with Ac, so ∩C∈{Ac,Bc}∪Y C = ∅. Hence
there exist ω ∈ ∩C∈{A,B}∪Y C and ω′ ∈ ∩C∈{Ac,Bc}∪Y C . For each individual i , we
define a probability function P∗i : σ(X) → [0, 1] by P∗i := xiδω + (1− xi )δω′ (where
δω, δω′ : σ(X) → [0, 1] are the Dirac-measures at ω and ω′, respectively), and we
then let Pi := P∗i |X . As each Pi satisfies Pi (A) = Pi (B) = xi ,
PP1,...,Pn (A) = DA(P1(A), . . . , Pn(A)) = DA(x),
PP1,...,Pn (B) = DB(P1(B), . . . , Pn(B)) = DB(x).
Further, for each Pi and each C ∈ Y , we have Pi (C) = 1, so that PP1,...,Pn (C) = 1 (by
consensus preservation). Hence PP1,...,Pn (∩C∈Y C) = 1, since ‘countable intersections
preserve probability one’. So,
PP1,...,Pn (∩C∈{A}∪Y C) = PP1,...,Pn (A) = DA(x),
PP1,...,Pn (∩C∈{B}∪Y C) = PP1,...,Pn (B) = DB(x).
To prove that DA(x) ≤ DB(x), it suffices to show that PP1,...,Pn (∩C∈{A}∪Y C) ≤
PP1,...,Pn (∩C∈{B}∪Y C). This is true because
∩C∈{A}∪Y C = ∩C∈{A,B}∪Y ⊆ ∩C∈{B}∪Y C ,
where the identity holds by an earlier argument. unionsq
A.3: Proof of Theorem 4(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 4(a) follows from Theorem 1(a) via Lemmas 4
and 5.22 It remains to prove both lemmas. We draw on a known agenda characterization
result and a technical lemma.
Proposition 4 (Dietrich 2016a) For any agenda X, the following are equivalent:
(a) X is non-nested with |X\{, ∅}| > 4;
22 This uses Lemma 11(b) below, where consensus preservation holds by consensus compatibility.
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(b) X has a (consistent or inconsistent) subset Y with |Y | ≥ 3 such that (Y\{A}) ∪
{Ac} is consistent for each A ∈ Y ;
(c) X has a (consistent or inconsistent) subset Y with |Y | = 3 such that (Y\{A}) ∪
{Ac} is consistent for each A ∈ Y .
Lemma 11 If D : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is the local pooling criterion of a neutral pooling
function for an agenda X ( = {, ∅}), then
(a) D(x) + D(1 − x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]n,
(b) D(0) = 0 and D(1) = 1, provided the pooling function is consensus preserving.
Proof (a) As X = {, ∅}, we may pick some A ∈ X\{, ∅}. For each x ∈ [0, 1]n ,
there exist (by A = ∅,) opinion functions P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX such that
(P1(A), . . . , Pn(A)) = x , which implies that (P1(Ac), . . . , Pn(Ac)) = 1 − x
and
D(x) + D(1 − x) = PP1,...,Pn (A) + PP1,...,Pn (Ac) = 1.
(b) Given consensus-preservation D(1) = 1. By part (a), D(0) = 1 − D(1). So
D(0) = 0.
unionsq
Proof of Lemma 4 Let D be the local pooling criterion of such a pooling function for
such an agenda X . Consider any x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]n with sum 1. By Proposition 4, there
exist A, B, C ∈ X such that each of the sets
A∗ := Ac ∩ B ∩ C, B∗ := A ∩ Bc ∩ C, C∗ := A ∩ B ∩ Cc
is non-empty. For all individuals i , since xi + yi + zi = 1 and since A∗, B∗, C∗ are
pairwise disjoint non-empty members of σ(X), there exists a P∗i ∈ Pσ(X) such that
P∗i (A∗) = xi , P∗i (B∗) = yi and P∗i (C∗) = zi . By construction,
P∗i (A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗) = xi + yi + zi = 1 for all i. (3)
Let Pi := P∗i |X for each individual i . For the profile (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ PnX thus defined,
we consider the collective opinion function PP1,...,Pn . We complete the proof by prov-
ing two claims.
Claim 1 P∗(A∗)+P∗(B∗)+P∗(C∗) = P∗(A∗∪B∗∪C∗) = 1 for some P∗ ∈ Pσ(X)
extending PP1,...,Pn .
The first identity holds for all extensions P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P , by pairwise disjointness
of A∗, B∗, C∗. For the second identity, note that each Pi has an extension P∗i ∈ Pσ(X)
for which P∗i (A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗) = 1, so that by consensus compatibility PP1,...,Pn also
has such an extension.
Claim 2 D(x) + D(y) + D(z) = 1.
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Consider an extension P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of PP1,...,Pn of the kind in Claim 1. As P∗(A∗ ∪
B∗ ∪ C∗) = 1, and as the intersection of Ac with A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗ is A∗,
P∗(Ac) = P∗(A∗). (4)
Since Ac ∈ X , we further have P∗(Ac) = PP1,...,Pn (Ac) = D(P1(Ac), . . . , Pn(Ac)),
where Pi (Ac) = P∗i (Ac) = xi for each individual i . So, P∗(Ac) = D(x). This and
(4) imply that P∗(A∗) = D(x). Analogously, P∗(B∗) = D(y) and P∗(C∗) = D(z).
So, Claim 2 follows from Claim 1. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 5 Consider any D : [0, 1n] → [0, 1] such that D(0) = 0 and
D(x) + D(y) + D(z) = 1 for all x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]n with x + y + z = 1. (5)
We have D(1) = 1 (since D(1) + D(0) + D(0) = 1 where D(0) = 0) and
D(x) + D(1 − x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1] (6)
(since D(x) + D(1 − x) + D(0) = 1 where D(0) = 0). Using (5) and then (6), for
all x, y ∈ [0, 1]n with x + y ∈ [0, 1]n ,
1 = D(x) + D(y) + D(1 − x − y) = D(x) + D(y) + 1 − D(x + y).
So,
D(x + y) = D(x) + D(y) for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]n with x + y ∈ [0, 1]n . (7)
Consider any individual i . We define Di : [0, 1] → [0, 1] by Di (t) =
D(0, . . . , 0, t, 0, . . . , 0), where t occurs at position i in (0, . . . , 0, t, 0, . . . , 0). By
(7), Di (s + t) = Di (s) + Di (t) for all s, t ≥ 0 with s + t ≤ 1. As one can
easily check, Di can be extended to a function D¯i : [0,∞) → [0,∞) such that
D¯i (s + t) = D¯i (s) + D¯i (t) for all s, t ≥ 0, i.e., such that D¯i satisfies the non-
negative version of Cauchy’s functional equation. So, there is some wi ≥ 0 such
that D¯i (t) = wi t for all t ≥ 0 (by Theorem 1 in Aczél 1966). Now, for all
x ∈ [0, 1]n , D(x) = ∑ni=1 Di (xi ) [by repeated application of (7)], and so (as
Di (xi ) = D¯i (xi ) = wi xi ) D(x) = ∑ni=1wi xi . Applying the latter with x = 1
yields D(1) = ∑ni=1wi , hence
∑n
i=1wi = 1. unionsq
A.4: Proof of Theorem 5(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 5(a) follows from Theorem 2(a) via Lemmas 6
and 5.23 It remains to prove Lemma 6.
23 This uses Lemma 11(b), where consensus preservation holds by conditional consensus compatibility.
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Proof of Lemma 6 Let D be the local pooling criterion of a neutral and conditional-
consensus-compatible pooling function for a non-simple agenda X . Consider any
x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]n with sum 1. As X is non-simple, there is a (countable) minimal
inconsistent set Y ⊆ X with |Y | ≥ 3. Pick pairwise distinct A, B, C ∈ Y . Let
A∗ :=
⋂
E∈Y\{A}
E, B∗ :=
⋂
E∈Y\{B}
E, C∗ :=
⋂
E∈Y\{C}
E .
As σ(X) is closed under countable intersections, A∗, B∗, C∗ ∈ σ(X). For each i ,
as xi + yi + zi = 1 and as A∗, B∗, C∗ are (by Y ’s minimal inconsistency) pairwise
disjoint non-empty members of σ(X), there exists a P∗i ∈ Pσ(X) such that
P∗i (A∗) = xi , P∗i (B∗) = yi , P∗i (C∗) = zi .
By construction,
P∗i (A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗) = xi + yi + zi = 1 for all i. (8)
Now let Pi := P∗i |X for each individual i , and let P := PP1,...,Pn . We derive four
properties of P (Claims 1–4), which then allow us to show that D(x)+D(y)+D(z) =
1 (Claim 5).
Claim 1 P∗(∩E∈Y\{A,B,C}E) = 1 for all extensions P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P.
For all E ∈ Y\{A, B, C}, we have E ⊇ A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗, so that by (8)
P1(E) = · · · = Pn(E) = 1, and hence P(E) = 1 [by consensus preservation,
which follows from conditional consensus compatibility by Proposition 1(a)]. So, for
any extension P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P , we have P∗(E) = 1 for all E ∈ Y\{A, B, C}. Thus
P∗(∩E∈Y\{A,B,C}E) = 1, as ‘countable intersections preserve probability one’.
Claim 2 P∗(Ac ∪ Bc ∪ Cc) = 1 for all extensions P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P.
Let P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) be an extension of P . Since A ∩ B ∩ C is disjoint from
∩E∈Y\{A,B,C}E , which has P∗-probability one by Claim 1, P∗(A ∩ B ∩ C) = 0.
This implies Claim 2, since Ac ∪ Bc ∪ Cc = (A ∩ B ∩ C)c.
Claim 3 P∗((Ac ∩ B ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩ Bc ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩ B ∩ Cc)) = 1 for some extension
P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P.
As Ac ∩ Bc is disjoint with each of A∗, B∗, C∗, it is disjoint with A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗,
which has P∗i -probability of one for all individuals i by (8). So, P∗i (Ac ∩ Bc) =
0, i.e., P∗i (Ac\B) = 0, for all i . Analogously, P∗i (Ac\C) = 0 and P∗i (Bc\C) =
0 for all i . Since, as just shown, each Pi has an extension P∗i which assigns zero
probability to Ac\B, Ac\C and Bc\C , by conditional consensus compatibility (and
Proposition 3) the collective opinion function P also has an extension P∗ ∈ Pσ(X)
assigning zero probability to these three events, and hence, to their union (Ac\B) ∪
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(Ac\C) ∪ (Bc\C) = (Ac ∩ Bc) ∪ (Ac ∩ Cc) ∪ (Bc ∩ Cc). In other words, with
P∗-probability of zero at least two of Ac, Bc, Cc hold. Further, with P∗-probability
of one at least one of Ac, Bc, Cc holds (by Claim 2). So, with P∗-probability of one
exactly one of Ac, Bc, Cc holds. This is precisely what had to be shown.
Claim 4 P∗(A∗)+ P∗(B∗)+ P∗(C∗) = P∗(A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪C∗) = 1 for some extension
P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P.
Consider an extension P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P of the kind in Claim 3. The first identity
follows from the pairwise disjointness of A∗, B∗, C∗. Regarding the second identity,
note that A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗ is the intersection of the events ∩E∈Y\{A,B,C}E and (Ac ∩
B ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩ Bc ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩ B ∩ Cc), each of which has P∗-probability of one by
Claims 1 and 3. So P∗(A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗) = 1.
Claim 5 D(x) + D(y) + D(z) = 1.
Consider an extension P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P of the kind in Claim 4. As P∗(A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪
C∗) = 1 by Claim 4, and as the intersection of Ac with A∗ ∪ B∗ ∪ C∗ is A∗,
P∗(Ac) = P∗(A∗). (9)
Since Ac ∈ X , we also have
P∗(Ac) = PP1,...,Pn (Ac) = D(P1(Ac), . . . , Pn(Ac)),
where Pi (Ac) = P∗i (Ac) = xi for all individuals i . So P∗(Ac) = D(x). This and
(9) imply that P∗(A∗) = D(x). Similarly, P∗(B∗) = D(y) and P∗(C∗) = D(z). So
Claim 5 follows from Claim 4. unionsq
A.5: Proof of Theorem 6(a)
As explained in the main text, Theorem 6(a) follows from Theorem 3(a) via Lemmas 7
and 5 [while applying Lemma 11(b)]. It remains to prove Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 7 Let D be the local pooling criterion for such a pooling function
for a partitional agenda X . Consider any x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]n with sum 1. Since X is
partitional, some countable Y ⊆ X partitions  into at least three non-empty events.
Choose distinct A, B, C ∈ Y . For each individual i , since xi + yi + zi = 1 and since
A, B and C are pairwise disjoint and non-empty, there is some Pi ∈ PX such that
Pi (A) = xi , Pi (B) = yi , Pi (C) = zi .
Let P be the collective opinion function for this profile. Since Y is a countable partition
of  and P can be extended to a (σ -additive) probability function, ∑E∈Y P(E) = 1.
Now, for each E ∈ Y\{A, B, C}, we have P(E) = 0 by consensus preservation (as
123
F. Dietrich, C. List
Pi (E) = 0 for all i). So P(A)+ P(B)+ P(C) = 1. Hence D(x)+ D(y)+ D(z) = 1
because
P(A) = D(P1(A), . . . , Pn(A)) = D(x),
P(A) = D(P1(B), . . . , Pn(B)) = D(y),
P(A) = D(P1(C), . . . , Pn(C)) = D(z).
unionsq
A.6: Proof of parts (b) of all theorems
Parts (b) of three of the six theorems will be proved by reduction to results in Part II.
To prepare this reduction, we first relate opinion pooling on a general agenda X to
premise-based opinion pooling on a σ -algebra agenda, as analysed in Part II. Consider
any agenda X and any σ -algebra agenda  of which X is a subagenda. (A subagenda
of an agenda is a subset which is itself an agenda, i.e., a non-empty subset closed
under complementation.) For instance,  could be σ(X). We can think of the pooling
function F for X as being induced by a pooling function F∗ for the larger agenda
. Formally, a pooling function F∗ : Pn → P for agenda  induces the pooling
function F : PnX → PX for (sub)agenda X if F∗ and F generate the same collective
opinions within X , i.e.,
F(P1|X , . . . , Pn|X ) = F∗(P1, . . . , Pn)|X for all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ P.
(Strictly speaking, we further require that PX = {P|X : P ∈ P}, but this requirement
holds automatically in standard cases, e.g., if X is finite or σ(X) = .24) We call F∗
the inducing pooling function, and F the induced one. Our axiomatic requirements
on the induced pooling function F—i.e., independence and the various consensus
requirements—can be related to the following requirements on the inducing pooling
function F∗ for the agenda  (introduced and discussed in Part II):
Independence on X For each A in subagenda X , there exists a function DA :
[0, 1]n → [0, 1] (the local pooling criterion for A) such that, for all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ P ,
PP1,...,Pn (A) = DA(P1(A), . . . , Pn(A)).
Consensus preservation For all A ∈  and all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ P , if Pi (A) = 1 for all
individuals i then PP1,...,Pn (A) = 1.
Consensus preservation on X For all A in subagenda X and all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ P , if
Pi (A) = 1 for all individuals i then PP1,...,Pn (A) = 1.
24 In these cases, each opinion function in PX is extendable not just to a probability function on σ(X), but
also to one on . In general, extensions beyond σ(X) may not always be possible, as is well-known from
measure theory. For instance, if  = R, X consists of all intervals or complements thereof, and  = 2R,
then σ(X) contains the Borel-measurable subsets of R, and it is well-known that measures on σ(X) may
not be extendable to  = 2R (a fact related to the Banach–Tarski paradox).
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Conditional consensus preservation on X For all A, B in subagenda X and all
P1, . . . , Pn ∈ P , if, for each individual i , Pi (A|B) = 1 (provided Pi (B) = 0),
then PP1,...,Pn (A|B) = 1 (provided PP1,...,Pn (B) = 0).25
The following lemma establishes some key relationships between the properties of
the induced and the inducing pooling functions:
Lemma 12 Suppose a pooling function F∗ for a σ -algebra agenda  induces a
pooling function F for a subagenda X (where X is finite or σ(X) = ). Then:
• F is independent (respectively, neutral, linear) if and only if F∗ is independent
(respectively, neutral, linear) on X;
• F is consensus-preserving if and only if F∗ is consensus-preserving on X;
• F is consensus-compatible if F∗ is consensus-preserving;
• F is conditional-consensus-compatible if F∗ is conditional-consensus-
preserving on X.
This lemma follows from a more general result on the correspondence between
opinion pooling on general agendas and on σ -algebra agendas.26
Lemma 13 Consider an agenda X and the corresponding σ -algebra agenda  =
σ(X). Any pooling function for X is
(a) induced by some pooling function for agenda ;
(b) independent (respectively, neutral, linear) if and only if every inducing pooling
function for agenda  is independent (respectively, neutral, linear) on X, where
‘every’ can further be replaced by ‘some’;
(c) consensus-preserving if and only if every inducing pooling function for agenda 
is consensus-preserving on X, where ‘every’ can further be replaced by ‘some’;
(d) consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling function for agenda
 is consensus-preserving;
(e) conditional-consensus-compatible if and only if some inducing pooling function
for agenda  is conditional-consensus-preserving on X
(where in (d) and (e) the ‘only if’ claim assumes that X is finite).
Proof of Lemma 13 Consider an agenda X , the generated σ -algebra  = σ(X), and
a pooling function F for X .
(a) For each P ∈ PX , fix an extension in P denoted P . Consider the pooling
function F∗ for  defined by F∗(P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ) = F(P∗1 |X , . . . , P∗n |X ) for all
25 If one compares this requirement with that of conditional consensus compatibility for a general agenda
X , one might wonder why the new requirement involves only a single conditional certainty (i.e., that of A
given B), whereas the earlier requirement involves an entire set of conditional certainties (which must be
respected simultaneously). The key point is that if each Pi is a probability function on , then the simplified
requirement as stated here implies the more complicated requirement from the main text.
26 More precisely, Lemma 12 is a corollary of a slightly generalized statement of Lemma 13, in which 
is either σ(X) or, if X is finite, any σ -algebra which includes X . Our proof of Lemma 13 can be extended
to this generalized statement (drawing on Lemma 15 and using an argument related to the ‘Claim’ in the
proof of Theorem 1(b) of Part II).
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P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ∈ P . Clearly, F∗ induces F (regardless of how the extensions P of
P ∈ PX were chosen).
(b) We give a proof for the ‘independence’ case; the proofs for the ‘neutrality’ and
‘linearity’ cases are analogous. Note (using part (a)) that replacing ‘every’ by
‘some’ strengthens the ‘if’ claim and weakens the ‘only if’ claim. It thus suffices
to prove the ‘if’ claim with ‘some’, and the ‘only if’ claim with ‘every’. Clearly, if
some inducing F∗ is independent on X , then F inherits independence. Now let F
be independent with pooling criteria DA, A ∈ X . Consider any F∗ : Pn → Pn
inducing F . Then F∗ is independent on X with the same pooling criteria as for
F because for all A ∈ X and all P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ∈ P we have
F∗(P∗1 , . . . , P∗n )(A) = F(P∗1 |X , . . . , P∗n |X )(A) as F∗ induces F
= DA(P∗1 |X (A), . . . , P∗n |X (A)) by F ’s independence
= DA(P∗1 (A), . . . , P∗n (A)).
(c) As in part (b), it suffices to prove the ‘if’ claim with ‘some’, and the ‘only if’
claim with ‘every’. Clearly, if some inducing F∗ is consensus-preserving on
X , F inherits consensus preservation. Now let F be consensus-preserving and
induced by F∗. Then F∗ is consensus-preserving on X because, for all A ∈ X
and P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ∈ P such that P∗1 (A) = · · · = P∗n (A) = 1, we have
F∗(P∗1 , . . . , P∗n )(A) = F(P∗1 |X , . . . , P∗n |X )(A) as F∗ induces F
= 1 as F is consensus preserving.
(d) First, let F be consensus-compatible and X finite. We define F∗ as follows. For
any P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ∈ P , consider the event A∗ in  which is smallest subject to
having probability one under each P∗i . This event exists and is constructible as
A∗ = ∩A∈σ(X):P∗1 (A)=···=P∗n (A)=1 A, drawing on finiteness of  = σ(X) and the
fact that intersections of finitely many events of probability one have probabil-
ity one. Clearly, A∗ is the union of the supports of the functions P∗i . We define
F∗(P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ) as any extension in P of F(P∗1 |X , . . . , P∗n |X ) assigning prob-
ability one to A∗. Such an extension exists because F is consensus-compatible
and each P∗i |X is extendable to a probability function (namely P∗i ) assigning
probability one to A∗. Clearly, F∗ induces F . It also is consensus-preserving:
for all P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ∈ P and A ∈ , if P∗1 (A) = · · · = P∗n (A) = 1, then A
includes the above-constructed event A∗, whence F∗(P∗1 , . . . , P∗n )(A) = 1 as
F∗(P∗1 , . . . , P∗n )(A∗) = 1.
Conversely, let some inducing pooling function F∗ be consensus-preserving. To
see why F is consensus-compatible, consider P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX and A ∈  such
that each Pi has an extension Pi ∈ P for which Pi (A) = 1. We show that
some extension P ∈ P of F(P1, . . . , Pn) satisfies P(A) = 1. Simply let P be
F∗(P1, . . . , Pn) and note that P is indeed an extension of F(P1, . . . , Pn) (as F∗
induces F) and P(A) = 1 (as F∗ is consensus-preserving).
(e) First, let F be conditional-consensus-compatible, and let X be finite. We define
F∗ as follows. For a profile (P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ) ∈ Pn , consider the (finite) set S of pairs
123
Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one...
(A, B) in X such that P∗i (A|B) = 1 for each i with P∗i (B) = 0 (equivalently,
such that P∗i (B\A) = 0 for each i). Since F is conditional-consensus-compatible
(and since in the last sentence we can replace each ‘P∗i ’ with ‘P∗i |X ’), there is
an extension P∗ ∈ P of F(P∗1 |X , . . . , P∗n |X ) such that P∗(A|B) = 1 for all
(A, B) ∈ S for which P∗(B) = 0. Let F∗(P∗1 , . . . , P∗n ) := P∗. Clearly, F∗
induces F and is conditional-consensus-preserving on X .
Conversely, let some inducing F∗ be conditional-consensus-preserving on X . To
check that F is conditional-consensus-compatible, consider P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX
and a finite set S of pairs (A, B) in X such that each Pi can be extended to
Pi ∈ P with Pi (A|B) = 1 (provided Pi (B) = 0). We require an extension
P∗ ∈ P of F(P1, . . . , Pn) such that P∗(A|B) = 1 for all (A, B) ∈ S for which
P∗(B) = 0. Now P∗ := F∗(P1, . . . , Pn) is such an extension, since F∗ induces
F and is conditional-consensus-preserving on X . unionsq
Which pooling functions for  induce ones for X? Here is a sufficient condition:
Lemma 14 If a pooling function for a σ -algebra agenda  is independent on a
subagenda X (where X is finite or σ(X) = ), then it induces a pooling function for
agenda X.
The proof draws on a measure-theoretic fact in which the word ‘finite’ is essential:
Lemma 15 Every probability function on a finite sub-σ -algebra of σ -algebra  can
be extended to a probability function on .
Proof Let ′ ⊆  be a finite sub-σ -algebra of σ -algebra , and consider any P ′ ∈
P′ . Let A be the set of atoms of ′, i.e., (⊆-)minimal events in ′\{∅}. As ′ is finite,
A must partition . So, ∑A∈A P ′(A) = 1. For each A ∈ A, let Q A be a probability
function on  such that Q A(A) = 1. (Such functions exist, since each Q A could
for instance be the Dirac measure at some ωA ∈ A.) Then P := ∑A∈A P ′(A)Q A
defines a probability function on , because it is a convex combination of probability
functions on . Further, P extends P ′, because it agrees with P ′ on A, hence on ′.
unionsq
Proof of Lemma 14 Suppose the pooling function F for σ -algebra agenda  is inde-
pendent on subagenda X , and that X is finite or σ(X) = . Let ′ := σ(X). If X
is finite, so is ′. Each P ∈ PX can by definition be extended to a function in P′ ,
which (by Lemma 15 in case ′ is a finite σ -algebra distinct from ) can be extended
to a function in P . For any Q ∈ PX , pick an extension Q ∈ P . Define a pooling
function F ′ for X by
F ′(Q1, . . . , Qn) := F(Q1, . . . , Qn)|X for all Q1, . . . , Qn ∈ PX .
Now F induces F ′ for two reasons. First, for all P1, . . . , Pn ∈ P ,
F ′(P1|X , . . . , Pn |X ) = F(P1|X , . . . , Pn |X )|X = F(P1, . . . , Pn)|X ,
where the second ‘=’ holds as F is independent on X . Second, PX = {P|X : P ∈ P},
where ‘⊇’ is trivial and ‘⊆’ holds because each P ∈ PX equals P|X . unionsq
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Proof of parts (b) of Theorems 1–6 First, Theorems 2(b) and 6(b) follow directly
from Theorems 1(b) and 3(b), respectively, since consensus compatibility implies
conditional consensus compatibility (by Proposition 1) and as non-neutrality implies
non-linearity.
Second, we derive Theorems 1(b), 3(b) and 5(b) from Theorems 1(b), 3(b) and
5(b) in Part II, respectively. The derivations are similar for the three results; we
thus spell out the derivation only for Theorem 1(b). Consider a nested agenda
X = {, ∅}. By Theorem 1(b) in Part II (see also the footnote to it), some pool-
ing function F∗ for agenda  := σ(X) is independent on X , (globally) consensus
preserving and non-neutral on X . By Lemma 14, F∗ induces a pooling function
for (sub)agenda X , which by Lemma 12 is independent, consensus-compatible, and
non-neutral.
Finally, we prove Theorem 4(b) directly rather than by reduction. Consider an
agenda X = {∅,} which is nested or satisfies |X\{∅,}| ≤ 4. If X is nested, the
claim follows from Theorem 1(b), since non-neutrality implies non-linearity. Now let
X be non-nested and |X\{∅,}| ≤ 4. We may assume without loss of generality
that ∅, /∈ X (as any independent, consensus-compatible, and non-neutral pooling
function for agenda X ′ = X\{∅,} induces one for agenda X ). Since |X | ≤ 4, and
since |X | > 2 (as X is non-nested), we have |X | = 4, say X = {A, Ac, B, Bc}. By non-
nestedness, A and B are logically independent, i.e., the events A∩B, A∩Bc, Ac∩B, and
Ac ∩ Bc are all non-empty. On PnX , consider the function F : (P1, . . . , Pn) → T ◦ P1,
where T (p) is 1 if p = 1, 0 if p = 0, and 12 if p ∈ (0, 1). We complete the proof
by establishing that (i) F maps into PX , i.e., is a proper pooling function, (ii) F is
consensus-compatible, (iii) F is independent, and (iv) F is non-linear. Claims (iii) and
(iv) hold trivially.
Proof of (i): Let P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX and P := F(P1, . . . , Pn) = T ◦ P1. We need
to extend P to a probability function on σ(X). For each atom C of σ(X) (i.e., each
C ∈ {A ∩ B, A ∩ Bc, Ac ∩ B, Ac ∩ Bc}), let PC be the unique probability function
on σ(X) assigning probability one to C . We distinguish between three (exhaustive)
cases.
Case 1: P1(E) = 1 for two events E in X . Without loss of generality, let P1(A) =
P1(B) = 1, and hence, P1(Ac) = P1(Bc) = 0. It follows that P(A) = P(B) = 1
and P(Ac) = P(Bc) = 0. So P extends (in fact, uniquely) to a probability function
on σ(X), namely to PA∩B .
Case 2: P1(E) = 1 for exactly one event E in X . Without loss of generality, assume
P1(A) = 1 (hence, P1(Ac) = 0) and P1(B), P1(Bc) ∈ (0, 1). Hence, P(A) = 1,
P(Ac) = 0 and P(B) = P(Bc) = 12 . So P extends (again uniquely) to a probability
function on σ(X), namely to 12 PA∩B + 12 PA∩Bc .
Case 3: P1(E) = 1 for no event E in X . Then P1(A), P1(Ac), P1(B), P1(Bc) ∈ (0, 1),
and so P(A) = P(Ac) = P(B) = P(Bc) = 12 . Hence, P extends (non-uniquely) to
a probability function on σ(X), e.g., to 12 PA∩B + 12 PAc∩Bc or 14 PA∩B + 14 PAc∩B +
1
4 PA∩Bc + 14 PAc∩Bc .
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Proof of (ii): Let P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX and consider any C ∈ σ(X) such that each Pi
extends to some P∗i ∈ Pσ(X) such that P∗i (C) = 1. (It only matters that P1 has such
an extension, given the definition of F .) We have to show that P := F(P1, . . . , Pn) =
T ◦ P1 is extendable to a P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) such that P∗(C) = 1. We verify the claim in
each of the three cases considered in the proof of (i). In Cases 1 and 2, the claim holds
because the (unique) extension P∗ ∈ Pσ(X) of P has the same support as P∗1 . (In fact,
in Case 1 P∗ = P∗1 .) In Case 3, C must intersect with each event in X (otherwise
some event in X would have zero probability under P1, in contradiction with Case 3)
and include more than one of the atoms A∩ B, A∩ Bc, Ac ∩ B, and Ac ∩ Bc (again by
Case 3). As is easily checked, C ⊇ (A ∩ B)∪ (Ac ∩ Bc) or C ⊇ (A ∩ Bc)∪ (Ac ∩ B).
So, to ensure that the extension P∗ or P satisfies P∗(C) = 1, it suffices to specify P∗
as 12 PA∩B + 12 PAc∩Bc in the first case, and as 12 PA∩Bc + 12 PAc∩B in the second case.unionsq
A.7: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider an opinion pooling function for an agenda X . We first
prove part (b), by showing that conditional consensus compatibility is equivalent to the
restriction of consensus compatibility to events A expressible as (∪(C,D)∈S(C\D))c
for finite S ⊆ X × X . This fact follows from the equivalence of conditional consensus
compatibility and implication preservation (Proposition 3) and the observation that,
for any such set S, an opinion function is consistent with zero probability of all C\D
with (C, D) ∈ S if and only if it is consistent with zero probability of ∪(C,D)∈S(C\D),
i.e., probability one of (∪(C,D)∈S(C\D))c.
We now prove part (a) The claims made about implicit consensus preservation and
consensus compatibility have already been proved (informally) in the main text. It
remains to show that conditional consensus compatibility implies consensus preser-
vation and is equivalent to it if X = σ(X). As just shown, conditional consensus
compatibility is equivalent to the restriction of consensus compatibility to events A of
the form (∪(C,D)∈S(C\D))c for some finite set S ⊆ X × X . Note that, for any A ∈ X ,
we may define S as {(Ac, A)}, so that (∪(C,D)∈S(C\D))c = (Ac\A)c = A. So, con-
ditional consensus compatibility implies consensus preservation and is equivalent to
it if X = σ(X). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 Assume || ≥ 4. We can thus partition  into four non-empty
events and let X consist of any union of two of these four events. The set X is indeed
an agenda since A ∈ X ⇔ Ac ∈ X . Since nothing depends on the sizes of the
four events, we assume without loss of generality that they are singleton, i.e., that
 = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4} and X = {A ⊆  : |A| = 2}.
Step 1. We here show that X is path-connected and non-partitional. Non-
partitionality is trivial. To establish path-connectedness, we consider events A, B ∈ X
and must construct a path of conditional entailments from A to B. This is done by
distinguishing between three cases.
Case 1: A = B. Then the path is trivial, since A ∗ A (take Y = ∅).
Case 2: A and B have exactly one world in common. Call it ω, and let ω′ be the
unique world in \(A ∪ B). Then A ∗ B in virtue of Y = {{ω,ω′}}.
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Case 3: A and B have no world in common. We may then write A = {ωA, ω′A} and
B = {ωB, ω′B} with ωA, ω′A, ωB , ω′B pairwise distinct. Now {ωA, ω′A} ∗ {ωA, ωB}
(take Y = {{ωA, ω′B}}) and {ωA, ωB} ∗ {ωB, ω′B} (take Y = {{ωB, ω′A}}).
Step 2. We now construct a pooling function (P1, . . . , Pn) → PP1,...,Pn that is
independent (in fact, neutral), consensus-preserving, and non-linear. As an ingredient
of the construction, consider first a linear pooling function L : PnX → PX (for
instance the dictatorial one given by (P1, . . . , Pn) → P1). We shall transform L into
a non-linear pooling function that is still neutral and consensus-preserving. First, fix
a transformation T : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that:
(i) T (1 − x) = 1 − T (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] (hence T (1/2) = 1/2),
(ii) T (0) = 0 (hence by (i) T (1) = 1),
(iii) T is strictly concave on [0, 1/2] (hence by (i) strictly convex on [1/2, 1]).
(Such a T exists; e.g. T (x) = 4(x − 1/2)3 + 1/2 for all x ∈ [0, 1].) Now, for any
P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX and A ∈ X , let PP1,...,Pn (A) := T (L(P1, . . . , Pn)(A)). We must
prove that, for any P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX , the function PP1,...,Pn , as just defined, can indeed
be extended to a probability function on σ(X) = 2. This completes the proof, as it
establishes that we have defined a proper pooling function and this pooling function
is neutral (since L is neutral), consensus-preserving (since L is consensus-preserving
and T (1) = 1), and non-linear (since L is linear and T a non-linear transformation).
To show that PP1,...,Pn can be extended to a probability function on σ(X) = 2, we
consider any probability function Q on 2 and show that T ◦ Q|X extends to a prob-
ability function on 2 (which completes our task, since Q|X could be L(P1, . . . , Pn)
for P1, . . . , Pn ∈ PX ). It suffices to prove that there exist real numbers pk = pQk ,
k = 1, 2, 3, 4, such that the function on 2 assigning pk to each {ωk} is a probability
function and extends T ◦ Q|X , i.e., such that
(a) p1, p2, p3, p4 ≥ 0 and p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1,
(b) for all A ∈ X , T (Q(A)) =
∑
k:ωk∈A
pk .
For all k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, let qk := Q({ωk}); and for all k, l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} with k < l,
let qkl := Q({ωk, ωl}). In order for p1, . . . , p4 to satisfy (b), they must satisfy the
system
pk + pl = T (qkl) for all k, l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} with k < l.
Given p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1, three of these six equations are redundant. Indeed,
consider k, l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, k < l, and define k′, l ′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, k′ < l ′, by {k′, l ′} =
{1, 2, 3, 4}\{k, l}. As pk + pl = 1− pk′ − pl ′ and T (qkl) = T (1−qk′l ′) = 1−T (qk′l ′),
the equation pk + pl = T (qkl) is equivalent to pk′ + pl ′ = T (qk′l ′). So (b) reduces
(given p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1) to the system
p1 + p2 = T (q12), p1 + p3 = T (q13), p2 + p3 = T (q23).
This is a system of three linear equations in three variables p1, p2, p3 ∈ R. To solve it,
let tkl := T (qkl) for all k, l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, k < l. We first bring the coefficient matrix
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of our three-equation system into triangular form:
⎛
⎝
1 1 t12
1 1 t13
1 1 t23
⎞
⎠ →
⎛
⎝
1 1 t12
−1 1 t13 − t12
2 t23 + t13 − t12
⎞
⎠
→
⎛
⎝
1 1 t12
1 −1 t12 − t13
1 t23+t13−t122
⎞
⎠ .
The system therefore has the following solution:
p3 = t23 + t13 − t122 (10)
p2 = t12 − t13 + t23 + t13 − t122 =
t12 + t23 − t13
2
(11)
p1 = t12 − t12 + t23 − t132 =
t12 + t13 − t23
2
Recalling that p4 = 1 − (p1 + p2 + p3), we also have
p4 = 1 − t12 + t13 + t232 . (12)
By their construction, the numbers p1, . . . , p4 given by (10 )–(12) satisfy condition
(b) and equation p1 + · · · + p4 = 1. To complete the proof of conditions (a)–(b), it
remains to show that p1, . . . , p4 ≥ 0. We do this by proving two claims.
Claim 1 p4 ≥ 0, i.e., t12+t13+t232 ≤ 1.
We have to prove that T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23) ≤ 2. Note that
q12 + q13 + q23 = q1 + q2 + q1 + q3 + q2 + q3 = 2(q1 + q2 + q3) ≤ 2.
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: All of q12, q13, q23 are at least 1/2. Then, by (i)–(iii), T (q12) + T (q13) +
T (q23) ≤ q12 + q13 + q23 ≤ 2, as desired.
Case 2: At least two of q12, q13, q23 are below 1/2. Then, again using (i)–(iii),
T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23) < 1/2 + 1/2 + 1 = 2, as desired.
Case 3: Exactly one of q12, q13, q23 is below 1/2. Suppose q12 < 1/2 ≤ q13 ≤ q23
(otherwise just switch the roles of q12, q13, q23). For all δ ≥ 0 such that q23 + δ ≤ 1,
the properties (i)–(iii) of T imply that
T (q13) + T (q23) ≤ T (q13 − δ) + T (q23 + δ). (13)
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Why is this true? If q13 − δ ≥ 1/2, it follows easily from T ’s convexity on [1/2, 1].
Now let q13 − δ < 1/2. Let δ1 = q13 − 1/2 and δ2 = 1/2 − (q13 − δ). So
T (1/2) − T (q13 − δ) = T (1/2) − T (1/2 − δ2)
= T (1/2 + δ2) − T (1/2) by (i)
≤ T (1/2 + δ2 + δ1) − T (1/2 + δ1) by convexity, cf. (iii)
= T (1/2 + δ) − T (q13).
Hence
T (q13) − T (q13 − δ) = T (q13) − T (1/2) + T (1/2) − T (q13 − δ)
≤ T (q13) − T (1/2) + T (1/2 + δ) − T (q13)
= T (1/2 + δ) − T (1/2)
≤ T (q23 + δ) − T (q23),
where the last inequality uses convexity, cf. (iii). Since T (q13)−T (q13−δ) ≤ T (q23+
δ) − T (q23), we obtain (13) by rearrangement.
Applying (13) with δ = 1 − q23, we obtain
T (q13) + T (q23) ≤ T (q13 − (1 + q23)) + T (1)
≤ T (1 − q12) + 1 = 1 − T (q12) + 1 = 2 − T (q12),
where the second inequality holds because T (1) = 1 and because T is increasing and
q13 − (1 + q23) ≤ 1 − q12. So T (q12) + T (q13) + T (q23) ≤ 2, as claimed.
Claim 2 pk ≥ 0 for all k = 1, 2, 3.
We only show that p1 ≥ 0, as the proofs for p2 and p3 are analogous. We have to
prove that t13 + t23 − t12 ≥ 0, i.e., that T (q13)+T (q23) ≥ T (q12), or equivalently, that
T (q1 + q3) + T (q2 + q3) ≥ T (q1 + q2). As T is increasing, it suffices to establish
that T (q1) + T (q2) ≥ T (q1 + q2). We again consider three cases.
Case 1: q1 + q2 ≤ 1/2. Suppose q1 ≤ q2 (otherwise swap the roles of q1 and q2).
For all δ ≥ 0 such that q1 − δ ≥ 0, we have
T (q1) + T (q2) ≥ T (q1 − δ) + T (q2 + δ),
as T is concave on [0, 1/2] and 0 ≤ q1 − δ ≤ q1 ≤ q2 ≤ q2 + δ ≤ 1/2. So, for
δ = q1,
T (q1) + T (q2) ≥ T (0) + T (q2 + q1) = T (q1 + q2).
Case 2: q1 + q2 > 1/2 but q1, q2 ≤ 1/2. By (i)–(iii),
T (q1) + T (q2) ≥ q1 + q2 ≥ T (q1 + q2).
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Case 3: q1 > 1/2 or q2 > 1/2. Suppose q2 > 1/2 (otherwise swap q1 and q2 in the
proof). Then q1 < 1/2, since otherwise q1+q2 > 1. Let y := 1−q1−q2. As y < 1/2,
an argument analogous to that in Case 1 yields T (q1) + T (y) ≥ T (q1 + y), i.e.,
T (q1)+T (1−q1−q2) ≥ T (1−q2). So, by (i), T (q1)+1−T (q1+q2) ≥ 1−T (q2),
i.e., T (q1) + T (q2) ≥ T (q1 + q2). unionsq
One might wonder why the pooling function constructed in this proof violates
conditional consensus compatibility. [It must do so, because otherwise pooling would
be linear—hence neutral—by Theorem 5(a).] Let  and X be as in the proof, and
consider a profile with complete unanimity: all individuals i assign probability 0 to
ω1, 1/4 to ω2, 1/4 to ω3, and 1/2 to ω4. As {ω1} is the difference of two events in X
(e.g. {ω1, ω2}\{ω2, ω3}), implication preservation (which is equivalent to conditional
consensus compatibility) would require ω1’s collective probability to be 0 as well. But
ω1’s collective probability is (in the notation of the proof) given by
p1 = t12 + t13 − t232 =
T (q12) + T (q13) − T (q23)
2
.
Here, qkl is the collective probability of {ωk, ωl} under a linear pooling function, so
that qkl is the probability which each individual assigns to {ωk, ωl}. So
p1 = T (1/4) + T (1/4) − T (1/2)2 = T (1/4) −
T (1/2)
2
,
which is strictly positive as T is strictly concave on [0, 1/2] with T (0) = 0.
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